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THE DUTY TO BARGAIN UNDER ERISA
JOHN A. FILLION* AND ANNE MCLEoD TREBILCOCK*
INTRODUCTION
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)1
profoundly affects the collective bargaining of employee benefit plans.
The Act prescribes the minimum requirements an employee benefit plan
must satisfy. Further, it defines certain bargaining choices, and provides
for alternative means of compliance, variances, and extensions of time,
all of which raise bargaining issues. Nonbenefit contract provisions will
be affected by ERISA, as will doctrines of successorship and the law of
information availability in collective bargaining. Finally, ERISA raises
questions of the relationship of its termination provisions to contract
terms agreed upon by the parties. Although the changes effected by
ERISA are quite significant, the aspects of the bargaining process left
unaltered by the Act are equally important. ERISA removes neither the
traditional duty of labor and management to bargain over most aspects
of employee benefits, nor the parties' obligation to abide by the legally
enforceable contract terms to which they have agreed.
The relationship of certain provisions of ERISA to the rights and
dudes of labor and management outlined in the National Labor Rela-
tions Act2 will be explored and discussed in this Article, and suggestions
will be offered for resolution of problems inherent in that relationship.
As litigation3 was needed to clarify the connection between contractual
"BA., Lawrence College; J.D., University of Michigan. General Counsel, United
Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW).
**B.A., Wellesley College; J.D., University of California, Berkeley. Assistant General
Counsel, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America (UAW).
Authors-Appreciation is expressed to Patricia Dufey, Actuarial Consultant, UAW,
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R Page, Assistant General Counsel, UAW, for assistance in the preparation of this
Article.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Star. 829 [hereinafter cited as ERISA].
2. The Wagner Act, 49 Star. 449 (1935), as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, 61
Stat. 136 (1947), comprises the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970),
as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 152, 158 (Supp. 1975) [hereinafter cited as NLRA].
3. See Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 467 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972); Hutchings v. United
States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d
324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971). The re-
lationship between arbitration and litigation under Title VII was resolved by the Supreme
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grievance arbitration clauses and individual rights under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,4 and the interplay of unfair labor practices
and arbitration, 5 judicial guidance ultimately will be required to eluci-
date the relationship of collective bargaining and resultant contractual
rights to the statutory scheme of ERISA.
Although most of the questions for collective bargaining examined in
this Article have not yet been answered, labor law practitioners already
are encountering new problems resulting from the enactment of ERISA.
For example, if benefit plans are rewritten to satisfy the requirements of
the Act, the employer's proposed language may omit provisions agreed
upon in prior contracts that have given employees rights exceeding
ERISA minimum standards.' To reap the benefits of ERISA, however,
unions cannot be required to relinquish gains previously won in bar-
gaining. The legislative history and the statutory and regulatory struc-
ture of ERISA demonstrate that the union need bargain over only those
changes required to bring the plan into compliance with the law.
In the area of plan terminations, conflicts already have arisen between
determinations of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, charged
with administering the insurance provisions of ERISA, and collective
bargaining contract provisions that relate to plan terminations. Diver-
gences occur chiefly over the circumstances triggering plan termination,
date of termination, the allocation of plan assets upon termination, and
the relationship of termination to other issues subject to bargaining.
Here, as in plan formulation, if the contract affords better protection to
employees than that imposed by the Corporation, the government and
Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), which held that prior
arbitration of a claim under Title VII would not bar trial de novo of that claim in
federal court. See generally Isaacson & Zifchak, Fair Employment Forwnns After Alex-
ander v. Gardner-Denver Co.: Separate and Unequal, 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 439
(1975).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(Supp. II, 1972).
5. For example, in Local 55, UAW v. Silver Creek Precision Corp., 89 L.R.R.M. 2922
(W.D.N.Y. 1975), the union was permitted to resort to arbitration over an employer's
failure to contribute to a pension plan at the same time that an unfair labor practice
charge and a criminal complaint were pursued.
6. This problem has been increased by the announcement that the Internal Revenue
Service will prepare model contract language for compliance with ERISA. The agency
was offering the prototype language to employers faced with amending existing plans
or establishing new plans. DAILY LAB. REP., Apr. 17, 1975, at A-1. In addition to the
inappropriateness of the preparation of such collective bargaining language by the IRS,
the action was taken without any recognition of the bargaining duties of employers
whose workers are represented by labor unions.
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judiciary should respect the parties' agreement under the National Labor
Relations Act.
The purpose of ERISA, to protect plan participants' and beneficiaries'
rights to earned benefits, and that of the National Labor Relations Act,
to foster good faith collective bargaining and enforcement of contracts
for the peaceful resolution of labor-management disputes, can be ac-
commodated and achieved only by the recognition that ERISA lays
down minimum standards for employee benefit plans. Employers and
unions should remain free to negotiate greater protection for workers
than that provided by statute.
I. THE IMPACT OF ERISA uPoN COLLFCTIW BARGAINING
A. The Scope of the Traditional Duty To Bargain
The National Labor Relations Act imposes a duty upon employers
and unions to bargain in good faith "with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment." 7 This duty encompasses
bargaining over employee benefits. Most employee benefits, including
pensions8 and insurance coverage,9 are mandatory subjects of bargaining,'
though an isolated few are permissive subjects only." The employer,
7. NLRA §§ 8(a) (5), (b) (3), (d), 9(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (5), (b) (3), (d), 159(a)
(1970).
8. Pensions were first established as mandatory subjects of bargaining in Inland Steel
Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1, 21 L.R.R.M. 1310 (1948), enforced, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
9. Insurance benefits were designated mandatory subjects in W.W. Cross & Co., 77
N.L.R.B. 1162, 22 L.R.R.M. 1131 (1948), enforced, 174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949), and
in General Motors Corp., 81 N.L.R.B. 779, 23 L.R.R.M. 1422 (1949), enforced, 179
F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1950).
10. The designation of a bargaining subject as "mandatory" has legal ramifications
beyond compelling inclusion of the subject in collective bargaining; the employer is
forbidden to take unilateral action with regard to that subject and employees are not
permitted to make individual agreements with the employer in the area. See generally
TnE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 389-439 (C. Morris ed. 1971).
The distinction between mandatory and permissive bargaining subjects has been
criticized for its inflexibility and lack of sound basis in the bargaining process. See
Note, Application of the Mandatory-Permissve Dichotomy to the Duty to Bargain
and Unilateral Action: A Reniew and Reevaluation 15 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 918
(1974).
11. By statute, Taft-Hartley type plans for child-care facilities and the establishment
of educational scholarship funds are permissive subjects of bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 186
(c) (7) (1970). But see Braeman, Child Care: A Mandatory or Permissive Item of Bar-
gaining, 26 LAB. LJ. 250 (1975). The Supreme Court also has declared retiree benefits
permissive subjects on the ground that retirees are not "employees" in the bargaining
unit within the meaning of section 8(a) (5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970).
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thus, cannot make a unilateral change with regard to most aspects of em-
ployee benefit plans without first bargaining in good faith with the union
to the point of impasse; to do otherwise constitutes a refusal to bargain
and gives rise to an unfair labor practice.12 A reciprocal duty is imposed
upon the union, with identical results for a breach. 13 Section 8 (d) of the
Act,' 4 however, specifies that bargaining over subjects raised during the
term of a collective bargaining agreement is required only if the subjects
were not discussed and made part of the agreement then in effect.15
A corollary to the duty to bargain is the obligation placed on the
employer to furnish the employees' collective bargaining representative
the information needed to bargain intelligently 16 and to police a contract
Allied Chem. Workers, Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chem. Div., 404 U.S. 157
(1971), aff'g Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chem. Div. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 936 (6th Cit.
1970). For a critique of the appellate court decision, see Note, Retirees in the Collec-
tive Bargaining Process: A Critical Review of Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 23
STAN. L. REv. 519 (1971). Although deferring to Pittsburgh Plate Glass, the NLRB
usually has managed to link bargaining over retirees' benefits with issues directly affect-
ing active employees, provided the union has so framed the case. See, e.g., Connecticut
Light & Power Co., 220 N.L.R.B. No. 143, 90 L.R.R.M. 1307 (1975); Union Carbide
Corp., 187 N.L.R.B. 113, 75 L.R.R.M. 1548 (1970), reaff'd, 197 N.L.R.B. 717, 80 L.R.R.M.
1429 (1972).
The other notable exception to employee benefits as mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining is less settled. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that
selection of an insurance carrier for an employee benefit plan, when that selection is
not integral to the plan's existence, is only a permissive subject, Connecticut Light &
Power Co. v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1973). Cf. NLRB v. Medical Manors,
Inc., 497 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1974) (employer's unilateral transfer of two employees
to another health plan a marginal violation of section 8(a) (1) of the NLRA). But see
Bastian-Blessing, Div. of Golconda Corp. v. NLRB, 474 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1973)
(employer's unilateral change to a self-insured plan a violation of section 8(a) (5)).
The National Labor Relations Board recently reaffirmed its position that a perform-
ance bond to insure payment of wages and fringe benefits is not a mandatory subject of
bargaining. Lathing Contrs. Ass'tv, Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. No. 8 (1976). The Board re-
jected the union's argument that the funding requirements of ERISA compelled the
Board to change its position on the duty to bargain over such bonds.
12. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962). An employer's refusal to bargain in
good faith is a violation of NLRA § 8(a) (5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970).
13. A union's refusal to bargain in good faith is a violation of NLRA § 8(b) (3), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1970).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
15. NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952), enforcing 94 N.L.R.B.
1214, 28 L.R.R.M. 1162 (1951).
16. See generally THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 309-22 (C. Morris ed. 1971); Bartosic &
Hartley, The Employer's Duty to Supply Information to the Union-A Study of the
Interplay of Administrative and Judicial Rationalization, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 23 (1972);
Fanning, The Obligation to Furnish Information During the Contract Tern, 9 GA. L.
Rav. 375 (1975). It has been urged that "[Wihen a party presents a claim, the re-
quirement of good faith bargaining should be held to entail that the claim be substan-
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during its term. The duty to divulge applies with equal force in the
area of employee benefit bargaining. 8 Equally fundamental to labor-
management relations is the obligation placed on both parties to abide by
the agreements they have reached. Section 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act 9 empowers federal courts to entertain suits for vio-
lations of contracts between unions and employers.
Notwithstanding a few permutations such as retiree pension benefits,2"
employee benefits have come within the traditional definition of manda-
tory subjects for collective bargaining and contract enforcement. ERISA
alters the scope of bargaining over employee benefits and, thus, funda-
mentally affects the collective bargaining relationship. The vast statu-
tory changes wrought by the Act have not, however, eroded the corner-
stones of the duty to bargain and to abide by agreements.
B. The Scope of Bargaining Under ERISA
ERISA significantly affects the scope and substance of the bargaining
in which labor and management must engage if they are to have a viable
pension plan or other employee benefit plan.21 The Act designates sub-
jects that must be included in any pension plan falling within its cover-
age, and specifies alternatives for compliance, variances, and extensions
of time for compliance. Each of these provisions raises bargainable issues.
The choices allowed by the law are all subject to the further constraint
of the statute's limits on decreasing participants' benefits by amendment
to any pension plan. Moreover, changes in employee benefit plans necessi-
tiated, even in the absence of . . . a specific need for the information." Bartosic &
Hartley, supra, at 50.
17. See Bartosic & Hartley, supra note 16, at 26-29; Fanning, supra note 16, passhn.
18. See NLRB v. Feed & Supply Center, Inc., 294 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1961); NLRB
v. John S. Swift Co, 277 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1960). See also Bartosic & Hartley, supra
note 16, at 30-33.
19. Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 171-87
(1970), as amzended, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 169, 183, 186 (Supp. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
LMRAJ provides in pertinent part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organi-
zation representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
LMRA § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970).
20. See note 11 supra.
21. Although parts 1, 4, and 5 of Title I of ERISA, relating to reporting and disclosure,
fiduciary responsibility, and enforcement, apply to all employee benefit plans, the Act
comes into full force with regard to pension plans. Accordingly, this Article focuses
on pension plans, particularly single employer plans.
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tated by ERISA may lead parties to seek other adjustments in their col-
lective bargaining agreements.
1. Establishment of Miinimuin Standards
The most obvious impact of ERISA upon collective bargaining results
from its designation of certain subjects for mandatory inclusion in pen-
sion plans. For every plan, the Act thus establishes a minimum scope of
bargaining, which cannot be altered by the parties. A pension plan, for
example, must include a qualified joint and survivor option,22 must meet
minimum vesting provisions, 2s and must fulfill certain funding require-
ments.24 The minimum requirements also may dictate changes in provi-
sions of collective bargaining agreements or plan documents that do not
overtly deal with participation, vesting, or funding, but that are affected
by the statute.
The parties must adopt in their pension plans at least the minimum
standards prescribed by ERISA. They are under no duty to consent to
less, because such an agreement would in effect create an unenforceable,
illegal contract provision.26 Should the parties seek to go beyond
ERISA's minimum requirements, of course, they could elect to bargain
for more stringent standards in their own plan. A party to a pension
plan agreement that exceeds ERISA's requirements, however, cannot
be required to engage in midterm bargaining to degrade the plan to
ERISA's minimum standards in any way.
Because ERISA establishes the subjects that must be included in a
viable plan and requires those subjects to meet certain criteria, the im-
22. ERISA § 205, 29 U.S.C.A. 5 1055 (1975).
23. Id. 203(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1053(a).
24. Id. 55302-06, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1082-86.
25. Thus, a contract that provides for a worker's compensation award offset against
pension benefits may be invalidated by the nonforfeiture provisions of ERISA. Id.
§ 203(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1053(a).
ERISA also will induce bargaining over subjects that would be troublesome to ignore
under the Act. For example, the Department of Labor has indicated that a fiduciary's
liability can be limited in certain circumstances, if the fiduciary's duties are specified
and if the document establishing the plan authorizes such division of responsibilities.
If the instrument does not provide for such allocation, any division of responsibilities
by the fiduciaries themselves will be ineffective to relieve a named fiduciary from
liability stemming from breach of the responsibilities allocated to other fiduciaries. 40
Fed. Reg. 47492 (1975). This advice is sure to lead to many revised plan documents.
26. It is axiomatic that portions of labor-management contracts that are illegal will
not be enforced by the federal courts. Accordingly, one party cannot require the
other to bargain over unlawful contract proposals. See, e.g., Meat Cutters' Union, 81
N.L.R.B. 1052, 23 L.R.R.M. 1464 (1949).
27. See notes 116-30 infra & accompanying text.
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pact of the Act on collective bargaining is of obvious importance. Never
before has legislation mandated the basic contents that a pension plan
must encompass.2 In this respect, ERISA's function resembles that of the
contract bar doctrine applied under the National Labor Relations Act.29
Just as a collective bargaining agreement must contain certain subjects
and meet selected criteria to qualify as a bar to a representation election
during its term,30 a pension plan must include certain elements to earn
the protections and benefits of ERISA.
ERISA additionally constrains bargaining between the parties by limit-
ing plan amendments that would decrease the benefits of any parti-
cipant, measured by various standards. Thus a plan amendment changing
a vesting schedule cannot result in a smaller nonforfeitable benefit.3
Similarly, a participant's accrued benefit is protected from reduction
through plan amendment.32 These benefits are further sheltered from
reduction through a plan merger or transfer.m Even the limited retroac-
tive amendments that may be allowed to reduce an accrued benefit are
subject to governmental approval before becoming effective.- Any
plan amendment that results in a decreased payable benefit to any parti-
cipant constitutes a reportable event, which the plan administrator must
report to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.35 Such a reportable
28. Although prior to ERISA the Internal Revenue Code set forth requirements for
a plan to qualify for a tax deduction, a pension plan did not need to qualify to exist.
INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a), 404(a).
29. The contract bar doctrine provides in essence that a contract meeting certain
requirements, with a term of up to three years, will bar another representation election
for its entire term. General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 51 L.R.R.M. 1247 (1962).
This doctrine was created by the NLRB to stabilize established collective bargaining
relationships. New Idea, Div. Avco Mfg. Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. 1104, 32 L.R.R.M.
1618 (1953).
30. To constitute a bar to a midterm representation election, a collective bargaining
agreement must meet certain criteria. The contract must be for a fixed duration, Pacific
Coast Ass'n of Pulp & Paper Mfrs., 121 N.L.R.B. 990, 42 L.R.R.M. 1477 (1958), must
contain the written substantial terms and conditions of employment necessary to stabi-
lize the bargaining relationship, Appalachian Shale Prods. Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1160, 42
L.R.R.M. 1506 (1958); Levi Strauss & Co., 218 N.L.R.B. No. 103, 89 L.R.R.M. 1402
(1975), and must have been signed before the petition for a certification election
was filed, Mt. Clemens Metal Prods. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 931, 35 L.R.R.M. 1159 (1954).
31. ERISA § 203 (c) (1) (A), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1053 (c) (1) (A) (1975).
32. Id. § 204(g), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1054(g).
33. Id. § 208, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1058.
34. Id. § 302(c) (8), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1082(c) (8); id. § 203 (a) (3) (C), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 1053(a) (3) (C).
35. Id. §§ 4043(a), (b) (2), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1343(a), (b) (2). The Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation is the body created by Title IV of ERISA to administer pension
plan termination insurance. Id. § 4002, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1302. The Corporation may termi-
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event could cause the Corporation to terminate the plan; therefore, the
parties would be wise to avoid bargaining a plan amendment that would
jeopardize payable benefits.
2. Alternative Methods of Compliance, Variances, and Extensions
Several provisions of ERISA provide for variances from standards,
alternative methods of compliance, or optional extensions of time for
compliance. The statute, however, is largely silent on the bargaining issues
raised by these choices. This silence cannot be interpreted to condone
the establishment of variant standards, methods of compliance, or time
extensions by the unilateral action of the employer. Nor does ERISA re-
lieve an employer from previously agreed upon contractual obligations
that exceed the requirements of the Act. ERISA establishes minimum
standards,36 but does not forbid provisions that exceed the statutory
minimums.
The choices made among ERISA's approved options have important
ramifications to plan participants, whose protection depends on the vest-
ing and funding provisions used. Accordingly, the determination of
these alternatives cannot be relegated to unilateral decisions by either
party, but should be subject to full and informed bargaining.
a. Alternative Methods of Compliance
ERISA offers alternatives for compliance with several of its provisions.
Three minimum choices are presented for compliance with vesting re-
quirements: full vesting of the accrued benefit after 10 years of service, 37
graded vesting, progressing from 25 percent vesting after 5 years of
service to 100 percent vesting after 15 years of service,,8 or vesting in ac-
cordance with "the rule of 45." Although a plan that incorporates
nate plans that fail to meet standards imposed by the Act. Id. § 4042, 29 U.S.C.A.
S 1342.
36. The Department of Labor recognized this in formulating its minimum standards
for compliance with the participation and vesting provisions, id. §§ 201-11, 29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1051-61. The implementing regulations issued by the Department provide: "The
standards contained in [ERISA], and the related [Internal Revenue] Code provisions, are
'minimum' standards. In general, more liberal plan provisions (in terms of the benefit
to be derived by the employee) are not prohibited." Department of Labor Reg.
§ 2530.200a-l(a), 40 Fed. Reg. 41661 (1975).
37. ERISA § 203(a) (2) (A), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1053(a) (2) (A) (1975).
38. Id. § 203(a) (2) (B), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1053(a) (2) (B).
39. Id. § 203 (a) (2) (C), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1053 (a) (2) (C). The basic "rule of 45" provides
that an employee with at least 5 years of service, the sum of whose age and service is
at least 45 years, has a 50 percent vested right to the accrued benefit. Id. § 203 (a) (2) (C) (i),
29 U.S.C.A. S 1053 (a) (2) (C) (i).
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any of these three alternatives satisfies ERISA, costs to the plan and cov-
erage of employees will be affected by the choice. Benefit accrual re-
quirements for employee pension plans also may be met by using one
of three methods: the "3 percent rule," 40 the "133 and rule," 41 or the
"pro-rata rule," 42 each of which carries slightly different consequences
for participants of the plan. Moreover, for certain types of plans, alter-
native minimum funding standards are available, which conceivably
could bear upon the financial soundness of a plan.4a
b. Variances and Extensions of Time for Compliance
ERISA allows application for variances to several of its standards. The
Secretary of Labor has discretion to grant a variance from the Act's
reporting and disclosure requirements.4 4 Upon the plan administrator's
petition or the Secretary's own motion, an alternative method may be
approved if it provides adequate disclosure to participants and benefi-
ciaries, and if the standard compliance method would increase costs to
the plan or impose unreasonable administrative burdens, thus making the
standard method adverse to the interests of plan participants measured in
the aggregate.45 If a determination on a variance involves an individual
plan, the Secretary must provide notice and an opportunity for interested
persons to present their views.46 If proposed for a group of plans, the
variance is subject to the publication requirements of proposed regula-
tions.47 The procedure to obtain a variance thus contains some protection
against unilateral action by one of the parties to a collective bargaining
agreement containing a pension plan.
In jointly administered plans, both the union and the employer will
know when the administrator seeks a variance. In the case of employer-
administered plans, however, the statute does not require that any notice
be given the union. The union should be considered an interested party,
and its views on the variance application should be sought. Plan partici-
pants who are union members, and, in some cases, union officials, will be
40. Id. § 204(b) (1) (A), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1054(b) (1) (A).
41. Id. § 204(b) (1) (B), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1054(b) (1) (B).
42. Id. § 204(b) (1) (C), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1054(b) (1) (C).
43. id. § 305, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1085.
44. Id. § 110(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a).
45. Id. §§ 110(a)(1)-(3), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1030(a)(1)-(3).
46. Id. § 110(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1030(b).
47. The Department of Labor already has approved alternative methods of compliance,
deferred compliance dates, and limited exemptions for certain types of plans. Depart-
ment of Labor Reg. §§ 2520.104-3, -20 to -25, 40 Fed. Reg. 34534 (1975).
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apprised of the variance, however, giving the union indirect notice. If
the plan is part of a group for which the Secretary of Labor proposes
a blanket variance, the Federal Register may be the only source of in-
formation about the proposed variance. This type of notice places special
burdens of vigilance upon employers and labor organizations who wish
to have a voice in determining the applicability of a variance for their
pension plan.
The other variances available under ERISA unfortunately do not
have even these inadequate requirements of notice to affected persons.
Prior to September 2, 1976, a vesting variance may be sought by an
administrator of a plan that existed on January 1, 1974.48 The Secretary
of Labor may approve the alternate vesting method for a period of not
more than four years, with an additional extension of up to three years
possible in certain circumstances.49 Although there is no requirement
under ERISA that the Secretary first consult the collective bargaining
representatives of the plan participants, it will be difficult to assess fairly
the factors in the decision without consulting the union. Moreover, the
employer has a duty under the National Labor Relations Act to keep
the union apprised of developments such as requests for variances and
extensions of time that affect the collectively bargained plan.
The most significant variances permitted are those from the funding
standards of ERISA. The Secretary of the Treasury has authority to
grant variances from the basic funding provisions of section 30250 if the
employer proves inability to satisfy the minimum standard because of
"substantial business hardship." "' Section 303 (b) outlines the factors to
48. ERISA § 207, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1057 (1975).
49. Such a request for an extension must be filed at least a year before the expiration
date of the original extension. Id. The variance may be granted only when: "(1) the
application [of the standard] requirements would increase the costs of the plan to such
an extent that there would result a substantial risk to the voluntary continuation of
the plan or a substantial curtailment of benefit levels or the level of employees' com-
pensation, (2) [it] would be adverse to the interests of plan participants in the aggre-
gate, and (3) a waiver or extension of time granted under Section 303 or 304 of this
Act [funding provisions] would be inadequate." Id.
50. Id. § 302, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1082.
51. Id. § 303(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1083(a). The statute provides for a variance "(a) If
an employer, or in the case of a multi-employer plan, 10% or more of the number of
employers contributing to or under the plan are unable to satisfy the minimum
funding standard for a plan year without substantial business hardship and if applica-
tion of the standard would be adverse to the interest of plan participants . . . ." Id.
The variance is not total, however, as the employer still must pay at least the amount
necessary to amortize each waived funding deficiency for each prior plan year in equal
installments until fully administered, over a period of 15 years. Id. § 302(b) (2) (C),
29 U.S.C.A. § 1082(b) (2) (C).
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be taken into account to determine substantial business hardship: eco-
nomic business loss, substantial unemployment or underemployment in
the trade or business and industry, depressed or declining sales and profits
in the industry, and a reasonable expectation that the plan can continue
only if the waiver is granted.52
In addition, the Secretary of the Treasury may authorize an extension
of the period of years required to amortize any unfunded liability of a
plan. Such an extension may be granted if it would provide adequate
protection for participants and their beneficiaries; further, failure to
grant the extension must be shown to lead to a substantial risk of volun-
tary discontinuation of the plan or substantial curtailment of pension
benefit levels or employee compensation, and to be adverse to the in-
terests of plan participants in the aggregate.5" The Secretary of the
Treasury also can permit extensions for retroactive changes in plans that
may bring temporary hardship to some plan participants. "14
Finally, the Secretary of Labor has discretion to authorize certain
retroactive plan amendments. 55 The criteria for approval are substantial
business hardship 56 and the unavailability or inadequacy of waiver under
section 303.5 Aside from the obvious direct effect, such approval from
the Secretary has ramifications for future benefits bargaining. Section
52. Id. § 303 (b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1083 (b).
53. Id. § 304(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1084(a).
54. Id. § 1023, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 401(b). Extensions will be allowed only if
all provisions of the plan that are necessary to satisfy such requirements are in effect by
the end of the extension period, and have been made effective for all purposes for the
whole of the period. Id.
55. Id. § 302(c) (8), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1082(c) (8). A plan amendment that retroactively
reduces the accrued benefits of any participant cannot take effect unless the plan
administrator files a notice with the Secretary and the Secretary has approved the
amendment within 90 days after the notice was filed, or has failed to disapprove it. Id.
A plan amendment applying to a plan year can be retroactive only if it:
(A) is adopted after the close of such plan year but no later than two
and a half months after the close of the plan year (or, in the case of
a multi-employer plan, no later than two years after the close of such
plan year),
(B) does not reduce the accrued benefit of any participant determined as
of the beginning of the first plan year to which the amendment ap-
plies, and
(C) does not reduce the accrued benefit of any participant determined as
of the time of adoption except to the extent required by the circum-
stances ....
Id.
56. The criteria are those of id. § 303(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1083(b). See notes 51-52
supra & accompanying text.
57. ERISA § 302(c) (8), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1082(c) (8) (1975).
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304(b) forbids any plan for which there has been obtained a waiver un-
der section 303 (a), an extension of time under section 304(a), or ap-
proval of a plan amendment under section 302 (c) (8) within the preced-
ing 12 months, from being amended to increase its liabilities. Included is
any amendment involving "any increase in benefits, any change in the
accrual of benefits, or any change in the rate with which benefits become
nonforfeitable." 58 Exceptions are made if the plan amendment is deter-
mined to be reasonable and to involve only de minimis increases in plan
liabilities,5 9 or if certain other limited conditions are met.60 Thus, the
granting of a funding variance, a retroactive plan amendment, or an ex-
tension of time could constrict bargaining over improvement in pension
benefits, because the parties are limited in the interim to benefit improve-
ments that have a de minimis effect on plan liabilities.
c. ERISA Alternatives and the Duty To Bargain
The variances, extensions of time, and alternative compliance methods
made available by ERISA give rise to two primary issues involving col-
lective bargaining: the union's right to participate in the decisionmaking
process opting for such alternatives, and the relationship of these statutory
accommodations to the obligations created by an existing collective bar-
gaining agreement. The impact a variance or extension may have on a
pension plan is substantial; similarly, each of the three alternatives in
vesting and benefit accrual may bring different results to a plan. These
are decisions that vitally affect collectively bargained plans, and should
be mandatory subjects of bargaining under traditional notions of the duty
to bargain.6 An employer taking unilateral action involving a variance,
extension of time, or choice of an alternative method for compliance
would proceed at the risk of the union pursuing appropriate legal relief.62
Yet ERISA encourages such employer action by failing to provide ade-
quate notice of requested changes to the collective bargaining representa-
tive, a gap that has not been filled by regulations. However, the pension
plan incorporated in a collective bargaining agreement normally in-
cludes vesting and funding provisions that can be amended only by the
58. Id. § 304(b) (1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1084(b) (1).
59. Id. § 304(b) (2) (A), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1084(b) (2) (A).
60. Id. 9§ 304(b) (2) (B)-(C), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1084(b) (2) (B)-(C).
61. See notes 7-20 supra & accompanying text.
62. Usually, this will mean filing an unfair labor practice charge against the employer
with the NLRB pursuant to NLRA § 8(a) (5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970). It also
could entail arbitration or a suit under section 301, depending upon the contract pro-
visions to be enforced. LMRA S 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). See note 19 supra &
accompanying text.
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parties' agreement. Thus an employer may receive a requested variance
from the government and still face an unfair labor practice charge and
proceedings to enforce the contract.
C. The Duty To Provide Information Under ERISA
ERISA does not change the basic duty of an employer to provide the
union with the information necessary to enable intelligent bargaining
and to police the collective bargaining agreement.63 The new law, how-
ever, fundamentally affects that duty by creating additional avenues for
the flow of information, thus indirectly providing the union with a fuller
information base, and by introducing more complex issues into the bar-
gaining arena, which will in turn necessitate even greater availability of
information for the union to perform its duty properly.
1. Reporting and Disclosure Requirements
The reporting and disclosure aspects of ERISA64 require the automatic
revelation of information about employee benefit plans that previously
was available to plan participants, beneficiaries, and the labor organiza-
tions representing them65 only through great persistence. Title I of
63. See note 16 supra.
64. ERISA §§ 101-11, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1021-31 (1975). A full survey of the reporting
and disclosure requirements of ERISA is beyond the scope of this Article, which is
intended merely to elucidate the relationship of those requirements to the duty to
bargain.
65. In the past, unions often have had to sue employers for their refusal to provide
information about employee benefits. Employers have refused to give information about
actuarial assumptions to be used in a pension plan, Cone Mills Corp. v. NLRB, 413 F.2d
445 (4th Cir. 1969); hours worked by individual employees, NLRB v. F.W. Wool-
worth Co., 352 U.S. 938 (1956) (per curiam), rev'g 235 F.2d 319 (9th Cir.); employees'
dates of hire, Herron Yam Mills, Inc., 165 N.L.R.B. 553, 65 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1967);
employees' ages, Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 850, 28 L.R.R.M. 1608 (1951);
data on retiree benefits, Connecticut Light & Power Co., 220 N.L.R.B. No. 143, 90
L.R.R.M. 1307 (1975); Union Carbide Corp., 187 N.L.R.B. 113, 75 L.R.R.M. 1548
(1970); data on benefits to which active employees are entitled, Ohio Car & Truck
Leasing, Inc., 169 N.L.R.B. 198, 67 L.R.R.M. 1150 (1968); costs of the plan to' the
employer, Industrial Welding Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 477, 71 L.R.R.M. 1076 (1969); Inter-
national Ass'n of Machinists, 172 N.L.R.B. 2086, 69 L.R.R.M. 1148 (1968); Skyland
Hosiery Mills, Inc, 108 N.L.R.B. 1600, 34 L.R.R.M. 1254 (1954); and information on
employee payments and disposition of dividends in an insurance plan, Phelps Dodge
Copper Prods. Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 360, 31 L.R.R.M. 1072 (1952). Companies have
refused even to give the union a copy of the employee benefit plan itself, C.H.
Guenther & Son, Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. 1202, 70 L.R.R.M. 1433 (1969); Rangaire Corp.,
157 N..R.B. 682, 61 L.R.R.M. 1429 (1966). They also have denied unions information
necessary to perform an audit on a plan that the union feared was inadequately funded,
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ERISA, which applies to all employee benefit plans, requires the plan
administrator to file with the Secretary of Labor a plan descrip-
tion,", an annual plan report, 7 a copy of the summary plan description
Michael Rossi Carpet Co., 208 N.L.R.B. 748, 85 L.R.R.M. 1347 (1974); Curtiss-Vright
Corp., 193 N.L.R.B. 940, 78 L.R.R.M. 1598 (1971).
The Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Star. 997,
repealed by ERISA § 111 (a) (1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1031 (a) (1) (1975), made some information
available to the public, but was criticized as being inadequate and ineffective.
66. ERISA §§ 102(b), 104(a) (1) (B), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1022(b), 1024(a) (1) (B) (1975).
The proposed form for reporting the plan description includes inquiries about identi-
fication of the plan, its administrator, and its agent for service of process; the plan
structure (such as single-employer), type (such as defined benefit plan or profit shar-
ing plan), and fiscal, year; the type (such as hourly employees) and number of active
and retired participants, allocated among those vested and those in pay status; the
persons performing various functions for the plan; whether the plan is maintained pur-
suant to one or more collective bargaining agreements; the sources and methods of
determining contributions to the plan, accumulation of assets, and disbursement of
benefits; and the procedures for presenting claims for benefits and review of claim
denials.
The proposed form also contains inquiries peculiarly directed to pension plans. In-
formation sought includes the general eligibility requirements for participants under
the plan; the general vesting provisions for employer contributions; the method used
to determine length of service for purposes of participation, vesting, and benefit ac-
crual; any break in service rules; and requirements for benefits eligibility. Several ques-
tions are posed for welfare plans only: the types of benefits provided, and the cir-
cumnstances that would result in ineligibility, denial, loss, forfeiture, or suspension of
such benefits. The form proposed by the Department of Labor appears at 40 Fed. Reg.
48096-102 (1975).
Department of Labor Reg. § 2520.104-3, 40 Fed. Reg. 34529 (1975), has extended the
period for compliance with the plan description requirements to May 30, 1976. A short
form document on basic plan information, however, was due August 31, 1975, or, for
plans not at that time covered by ERISA, 120 days after it became so covered. Id.
67. ERISA §§ 103, 104(a) (1) (A), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1023, 1024(a) (1) (A) (1975). To col-
lect annual reports, the Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Labor proposed
form 5500. The form requires employers of all sizes (except those maintaining a
Keogh plan that includes fewer than 100 participants, at least one of whom is an
owner-employee) to provide the following information: identification of the plan, the
sponsor or employer, and the fiduciaries; the number of plan participants, beneficiaries
and fiduciaries; whether the plan was amended or subject to termination action within
the reporting year; whether it was merged or consolidated with another plan, or its
assets or liabilities transferred to another plan; an explanation of any changes made in
the appointment of any trustee, qualified public accountant, insurance carrier, enrolled
actuary, administrator, investment manager. or custodian; any payments made to
fiduciaries and to persons who rendered services to the plan; and statements of the
plan's assets and liabilities, income and expenditures during the reporting year. Schedule
A attached to form 5500 requires information about insurance coverage for plans and
the costs thereof, and schedule B contains the actuary's report. This report is the
crucial piece of information for those seeking to analyze a plan's financial status. It
contains information on contributions received, contributions required for the plan
to meet the minimum funding standard (or the alternate standard), the accumulated
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that must be given to plan participants and beneficiaries," s and,
within 60 days of their occurrence, any modifications or changes made
in the plan.69 The administrator, moreover, must give each participant
and beneficiary a copy of the summary plan description, summaries of
the latest annual report, and certain other information. 0 In addition, the
participant or beneficiary may request much more detailed information
about the plan in general or the individual's account, which the adminis-
trator must furnish within certain time limits.71
These requirements make more information about employee benefit
plans publicly available than ever before. The reporting and disclosure
requirements are supplemented by civil and criminal sanctions72 for
failure to honor requests for information, thus providing remedies much
more effective than any available to a labor union for breach of the duty
to provide information under the National Labor Relations Act.73
Although the statute carelessly fails to provide for the collective bar-
gaining representative to obtain copies of all information that is reported
and disclosed, as a practical matter the union should be able to obtain
it.74 Unions whose local officers serve on joint boards of administration
funding deficiency, the normal cost for the plan year, and the current market value of
assets in the plan. It also lists the number of individuals covered by the plan, divided
into active participants, terminated participants with vested rights, retirees, and bene-
ficiaries of deceased participants. Finally, the actuary must state the actuarial assump-
tions used and the monthly contributions made by the employer and the employees;
he also must set forth the funding standard account statement, showing charges and
credits. Proposed form 5500, form 5500-K (which applies to Keogh plans with fewer
than 100 participants), and instructions are reproduced at 40 Fed. Reg. 45135-56 (1975).
68. ERISA §§ 102(a), 104(a) (1) (C), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1022(a), 1024(a) (1) (C) (1975).
69. Id. § 104(a) (1) (D), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1024(a) (1) (D).
70. Id. § 101(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1021(a).
71. Id. §§ 104(b) (4), 105, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1024(b) (4), 1025.
72. An administrator who fails to comply with a proper request for information from
a beneficiary or participant within 30 days after the request is made may be personally
liable for up to $100 a day from the date of the failure or refusal. Other relief lies
within the discretion of the court. Id. § 502(c), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(c). Any individual
convicted of willfully violating the reporting and disclosure provisions of the Act or
any regulation or order promulgated thereunder may be fined not more than $5,000
or imprisoned for not more than one year. A maximum fine of $100,000 may be im-
posed on corporations. Id. § 501, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1131.
73. Failure to provide the union with the information necessary to bargain intelli-
gently is an unfair labor practice under section 8(a) (5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (5) (1970), the remedy for which is an order by the NLRB to the employer
to furnish the information requested by the union, under section 10(c) of the NLRA,
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
74. The union could request the information through an officer or member who
is also a plan participant. Alternatively, the union could examine the annual report re-
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for employee benefit plans should be privy to whatever information is
available to the employer's representatives on the board. When the joint
board is the plan administrator under the definition included in
ERISA, 75 the union representatives on the board should have access to
the data on which the administrator's annual report is based.
2. Termination Notification Requirements
The termination provisions of ERISA also could free more detailed
information about an employer's financial soundness. The employer bears
the duty of immediately informing the plan administrator of the occur-
rence of a "reportable event" within the meaning of section 4043."° These
events include the failure of a plan to meet the minimum funding stand-
ard of the Act,77 its inability to pay benefits when due,J and its merger,
consolidation, or transfer of assets. 79 Such information may provide the
union with data it might not otherwise obtain until a much later time.
Given this information, the union should be in a much better position
to judge the overall fiscal strength of the company. In turn, more in-
formed bargaining on both sides of the table should result.80
3. The Increased Need for Information
Although ERISA should increase the data flow for pension bargaining,
it also creates I greater need for information. Through its direct and in-
quired to be filed in the Department of Labor offices. See ERISA § 106(a), 29 U.S.C.A.
S 1026(a) (1975). If necessary, the union could gain access to the information through
a request to the government under the Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No.
93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974), avnending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), with the avenue of
litigation in federal district court available if the Department of Labor withheld the
requested information. Id. § 552(a) (3).
75. ERISA § 3(16) (A), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(16) (A) (1975), defines the plan "ad-
ministrator" as "(i) the person specifically so designated by the terms of the instrument
under which the plan is operated; (ii) if an administrator is not so designated, the plan
sponsor . . . ." The term "plan sponsor" is defined to include "in the case of a plan
established or maintained . . . jointly by one or more employers and one or more
employee organizations, the association, committee, joint board of trustees, or other
similar group of representatives of the parties who establish or maintain the plan." Id.
S 3 (16) (B) (iii), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002 (16) (B) (iii).
76. Id. § 4043, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1343.
77. Id. § 4043 (b) (5), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (b) (5).
78. Id. S 4043(b) (6), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1343(b) (6).
79. Id. § 4043(b) (8), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1343(b) (8).
80. A union also can gain information about the financial dealings of a company
if the plan administrator applies for a variance from the prohibited transaction pro-
visions under id. § 408(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1108(a), which require notice of the applica-
tion for the exemption to interested parties.
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direct effects on the scope of bargaining, ERISA will push unions to
seek more information than they may have requested in the past. Just
as ERISA prescribes the contents of each plan, it requires that pension
provisions be more skillfully drafted and carefully watched.
Moreover, since participants and beneficiaries receive direct notice
under the Act,"' they may use their greater awareness to pressure union
leadership in pension bargaining. The right of a participant or bene-
ficiary to sue,82 coupled with the potential of attorney's fees and costs, 3
also will encourage the union to base its bargaining decisions and its con-
tract administration on the most information available. Although a union
rarely will face a successful suit for breach of the duty of fair represen-
tation,8 4 union officials who are plan fiduciaries under ERISA face possi-
ble personal liability. 5 Informed decisionmaking and contract adminis-
tration can best protect against political consequences as well as remote
81. See notes 66-72 supra & accompanying text.
82. ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132 (1975).
83. ld. § 502(g), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(g).
84. Attempts to demonstrate that a union has acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in
bad faith in the pension area have failed. The standard for showing a breach of the
duty of fair representation, established in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), and re-
affirmed in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 44 U.S.L.W. 4299 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1976),
has not been met in cases involving pensions. See, e.g., Jackson v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 457 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1972); Nedd v. UMW, 400 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1968).
Before the adoption of ERISA, injured plan participants and beneficiaries seeking
to hold a union liable relied on one of four remedies: suit against the union for breach
of its duty of fair representation, under Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); suit under
section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970); suit under section 302(c)(5) of
the LMRA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 186(c) (5) (Supp. 1975), anending 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5)
(1970), for breach of the union trustees' fiduciary responsibility to the employees
whom they represented; and suit under section 302(e) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 186(e)
(1970), which gave the federal courts jurisdiction to order affirmative relief to remedy
the failure of a plan to qualify under LMRA section 302(c) (5). See Goetz, Developing
Federal Labor Law of Welfare and Pension Plans, 55 Cox-LL L. REv. 911 (1970).
85. The Department of Labor has attempted to clarify the definition of fiduciaries
and their potential liability. Basically, anyone with "discretionary authority or discre-
tionary responsibility in the administration" of a plan within the meaning of section
3(21) (A) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(21) (A) (1975) is a fiduciary. 40 Fed. Reg.
47491 (1975); cf. Department of Labor Reg. § 2510.3-21, 40 Fed. Reg. 50842 (1975)
(definition of fiduciary includes investment advisors of plan). This definition encom-
passes many union officials sitting with management on joint boards of trustees to ad-
minister pension plans. Union officials, of course, also remain subject to the fiduciary
responsibility constraints in the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(Landrum-Griffin Act), 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1970). Hood v. Journeymen Barbers, 454 F.2d
1347 (7th Cir. 1972). See generally Gertner, Trustee Liability Insurance Under ERISA,
17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 233 (1975).
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legal exposure. The following are but two examples of plan provisions
requiring particular vigilance.
a. Prohibited Transactions
ERISA renders impermissible many types of financial transactions that
were common for pension plans in the past."6 Among these are certain
types of loans from a pension fund8 7 and limitations on plan purchases
of securities or real property of the company or of any of its affiliates. 88
Union representatives who are involved in plan financial decisions must
be privy to information to enable them to protect themselves as well as
the plans. Thus they must have access to an employer's corporate struc-
ture in addition to information on all the plan's loans and investments.
b. Joint and Survivor Options
A union should be sure that a joint and survivor option newly added
to a plan meets all pertinent legal requirements, including not only com-
pliance with ERISA but with other laws as well. The option must provide
equal coverage to husbands and wives to satisfy Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.89 Similarly, the forfeiture provisions and the option
86. ERISA §§ 406-07, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1106-07 (1975) detail the transactions that are pro-
hibited. These are more exhaustive than the restrictions that were placed on pension
plans established under L.IIRA § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C.A. § 186(c)(5) (Supp. 1975),
tmzending 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1970), which required only that payments to a
pension fund be held in trust, that the payments be made pursuant to a written agree-
ment with the employer, that employees be equally represented, that an annual
audit take place, and that payments designed for use as pensions and annuities be held
exclusively for that purpose.
87. ERISA prohibits a fiduciary from involvement in a transaction if the fiduciary
knows or should know that the transaction is a direct or indirect loan between the
plan and any party in interest. ERISA § 406(a) (1) (B), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1106(a) (1) (B)
(1975). This, of course, requires the fiduciary to know who qualifies as a party in
interest in relationship to the fund, necessitating even greater information to be freely
available to union representatives. Exemptions to the Act's prohibitions appear in id.
5 408(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1108(b). See also 40 Fed. Reg. 34587 (1975) (clarifying the
section 414(c) (4) exemption from prohibited transactions).
88. ERISA § 407, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1107 (1975).
89. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c to 2000e-15 (1970), as amtended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c to 2000Oe17
(Supp. II, 1972). In addition to ensuring that benefits are awarded to survivors on the
same basis regardless of sex, parties to a pension benefit plan may need to reexamine
actuarial assumptions, which often contain sex-based differences that may violate the
antidiscrimination provisions of Title VII. Henderson v. Oregon, 11 BNA F.E.P. CAs.
1218 (D. Ore. 1975); lanhart v. Los Angeles, 387 F. Supp. 980 (C.D. Cal. 1975), appeal
docketed, No. 2729, 9th Cir., Aug. 7, 1975. See Bernstein & WAilliams, Title VII and the
Problen of Sex Classification in Pension Programs, 74 Coi.um. L. REV. 1203 (1974); Note,
Sex Discrimination and Sex-Based Mortality Tables, 53 B.U.L. REv. 624 (1973). But cf.
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to cancel the survivor's potential benefit could raise questions for unions
representing workers living in states that employ community property
concepts for married couples.90
Although ERISA should- moot previous labor-management conflict
over the availability of basic information regarding benefit plans,9 it
will raise new disputes over the employer's duty to provide additional
information that the union feels is now necessary for employee benefit
bargaining. A union cannot adequately protect its members' interests in
a pension plan unless it has access to information far more detailed and on
a wider range of subjects than employers are accustomed to providing.
Having created more complexities for pension bargainers, ERISA
should stimulate the National Labor Relations Board to impose a more
stringent obligation upon employers to provide unions with whatever
information they seek relevant to employee benefits.
D. Employer Successorship Under ERISA
The duty of a successor employer to bargain with an incumbent union
is altered significantly by ERISA. The Act presents new variables that
must be considered by an employer contemplating the purchase of a
company that maintained a pension plan for its employees.
1. The Burns Doctr-ine
The relationship of a successor employer to an incumbent union has
been the subject of several important Supreme Court decisions.9 2 The
Note, Sex Discrimination in Employee Fringe Benefits, 17 Vm. & MARY L. REv. 109,
132-34 (1975).
90. In some community property states, such as California, a spouse's share in the
employee spouse's vested retirement benefits is regarded as part of the body of marital
property to be divided in a preretirement dissolution. See, e.g., Benson v. City of
Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 355, 384 P.2d 649, 33 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1963); Thiede, The Corn-
mniity Property Interest of the Non-Employee Spouse in Private Employee Retirement
Benefits, 9 U.S.F.L. REv. 635 (1975). A pension plan covering members in such a state
therefore would require provisions recognizing this principle while still complying with
the joint and survivor and forfeiture provisions of ERISA.
91. See note 65 supra.
92. See Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local, Hotel Employees, 94 S. Ct. 2236 (1974);
Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973); NLRB v. Burns Intl. Sec.
Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543
(1964).
The doctrine of successorship also has been a fertile field of commentary. Several
of the most notable recent articles are Slicker, A Reconsideration of the Doctrine of
Employer Successorship-A Step Toward a Rational Approach, 57 MINN. L. REv. 1051
(1973); Vernon, Successorship and Collective Bargaining Agreements in Business Corn-
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Court ruled in NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc. 3
that a successor employer has a duty to bargain with the collective bar-
gaining representative of the predecessor employer's workers if a ma-
jority of those employees constitute the new employer's work force,
and if the former bargaining unit is still appropriate after the change in
ownership. A new employer "may be a successor for some purposes
and not for others." 14 The successor employer is not bound by the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the union and the
predecessor employer, however. 5 In formulating this policy, one of the
Court's main concerns was to ensure that a potential buyer of a failing
business would not be discouraged by the prospect of assuming all of
the predecessor's past obligations."'
2. Successorship Provisions of ERISA
ERISA introduces new considerations into the relationship of a union
and successor employer with respect to pension plan coverage. Section
210 (b) of the Act states that for purposes of participation, vesting, bene-
fit accrual, and funding, when an employer maintains a plan of a prede-
cessor employer, "service for such predecessor shall be treated as service
for the employer." 17 Even when the successor employer initiates a new
binations and Acquisitions, 24 VAND. L. REv. 903 (1971); Note, The Bargaining Obliga-
tions of Successor Employers, 88 HARV. L. REv. 759 (1975); Note, Recent Developments
in Labor Law Successorsbip, 26 SYRACUSE L. R~v. 798 (1975).
93. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
94. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local, Hotel Employees, 94 S. Ct. 2236, 2243
n.9 (1974).
The Court has distinguished between obligations under a contract and continuing
obligations under the NLRA. Thus, if a new employer retains former employees, he may
be obligated to remedy the predecessor employer's unfair labor practices to protect
the rights of incumbent employees under the NLRA. Golden State Bottling Co. v.
NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 184-85 (1973). Similarly, the Court could distinguish between
obligations under a former contract and obligations under ERISA to protect employees'
rights to benefits.
95. 406 U.S. at 286-91.
96. "A potential employer may be willing to take over a moribund business only if
he can make changes in corporate structure, composition of the labor force, work loca-
tions, task assignment, and nature of supervision. Saddling such an employer with the
terms and conditions of employment contained in the old collective-bargaining contract
may make these changes impossible and may discourage and inhibit the transfer of
capital." NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 287-88 (1972). This
emphasis on the easy transfer of capital is a possible means of reconciling the somewhat
inconsistent approaches of NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., supra, and John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964). See Note, Recent Developments
in Labor Law Successorship, 26 SYRACUSE L. REv. 798, 810-12 (1975).
97. ERISA S 210(b) (1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1060(b)(1) (1975).
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plan, service for the predecessor, to the extent provided by regulations to
be issued by the Treasury Department, will be considered service for the
successor employer. These provisions promise to have both practical
and legal effects on the doctrine of successorship.
As applied to pensions, the rule of Burns, that a successor employer
cannot be bound by the terms of its predecessor's collective bargaining
agreement,9 9 will be undermined by section 210(b). Once an employer
has decided to maintain the predecessor's pension plan, ERISA constricts
considerably the ability to alter the contents and obligations of that plan.
This is particularly evident when section 210 is coupled with the restric-
tions on forfeiture and reduction of benefits that appear throughout the
Act.100 ERISA will tend to bind a successor employer to the terms of the
predecessor's collective bargaining agreement when the successor has
decided to maintain the predecessor's plan.
Even more precedent shattering is the provision of section 210 (b) (2),
which purports to bind even those who have not explicitly assumed the
pension plans of their predecessors. 0' Within the scope of the forth-
coming Treasury Department regulations, the new employer will be
bound to recognize service with the predecessor employer even when a
completely new plan is established. This protection is crucial to the ef-
fectuation of one purpose of ERISA, the prevention of abuses of em-
ployee benefit forfeiture. The Act, however, also obviously imposes con-
straints on the maneuverability of successor employers, which the courts
have sought to protect in the past.102
3. Practical Implications
As a practical matter, the blessings of section 210 may indeed be mixed
for employees and labor organizations. In dealing with new employers
who are willing to assume the predecessor's pension plan or establish a
new plan, the effects of section 210 probably will be beneficial. Em-
ployees will keep their earned pension rights without risking diminution
of benefits. Since the past service liability assumed by the successor em-
ployer will relate to previously negotiated benefit levels, those levels may
act as a floor for future pension benefit bargaining with the successor.
98. Id. § 210(b) (2), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1060(b) (2).
99. See notes 92-96 supra & accompanying text.
100. See notes 55-58 supra & accompanying text.
101. ERISA § 210(b) (2), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1060(b)(2) (1975). See note 98 supra &
accompanying text.
102. See notes 92-96 supra & accompanying text.
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An uncooperative successor employer may use section 210 to justify
a more intransigent position toward the incumbent union and the pen-
sion plan it had negotiated. In an attempt to avoid the past service liability
incurred through assumption of the employees' credited service with the
predecessor employer, the successor may refuse to agree to any pension
plan. The successor employer might propose an employee profit sharing
plan, free from ERISA requirements, in its place.
In combination with traditional successorship doctrine, section 210(b)
could even encourage a successor employer to discharge all incumbent
employees with vested pensions. In this way, the employer would at-
tempt to avoid both the potential obligations under section 210(b) and
the duty to bargain under Burns, which requires bargaining only in case
of continuity in the work force.103 Such discharges, however, would
run afoul of the National Labor Relations Act 10 4 and the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act.10 5
Finally, the assumption of a large past service liability could discour-
age a prospective buyer who wishes to retain incumbent employees but
who does not want to assume the pension debt. In some cases, section
210(b) could scare off the few potential purchasers that a financially
troubled business has been able to attract.
4. Termination Consequences
The interplay of ERISA with traditional notions of successorship also
arises in the termination insurance provisions of the Act. ERISA pro-
vides an express definition of successorship for purposes of plan termina-
tion insurance coverage: termination insurance covers a "successor plan,"
defined as "a continuation of a predecessor plan." 106 The government,
103. See notes 92-96 sitpra & accompanying text.
104. The successor employer would be discriminating against incumbent employees
for exercise of their NLRA section 7 rights in having bargained for an effective pension
plan with the old employer, in probable violation of NLRA §§ 8(a) (1), (3), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(a)(1), (3) (1970).
105. If incumbent employees aged 40 to 65 with vested pension benefits were discharged
in disproportionate numbers, they could pursue remedies under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1970).
106. ERISA § 4021(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1321 (a) (1975). The statute continues: "For this
purpose, a successor plan is a plan which covers a group of employees which includes
substantially the same employees as a previously established plan, and provides substan-
tially the same benefits as that plan provided." Id. For purposes of liability to the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, moreover, section 4062(d) covers a "successor
corporation," a notion that there refers to corporate reorganization rather than to a
bargaining relationship. Id. § 4062(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1362(d).
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through the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, is liable to fewer
employees following plan termination than are successor employers.
Burns requires that only a majority of the successor employer's work
force be incumbent employees to result in potential past service liability
for the successor, whereas section 4021 (a) of ERISA insists upon "sub-
stantially the same employees" as those included in the predecessor plan.
This enables the successor plan to obtain credit for the time the predeces-
sor plan was in effect.107 This discrepancy occurs without explanation,
but may be due to the effect of this restrictive definition on the amount of
guaranteed pension benefits. Under section 4022 (b) (8) of the Act, the
amount of the benefit that is covered by termination insurance relates
directly to the length of time that a benefit has been in effect. 08 Thus,
assuming equal benefit levels, a successor plan with a pension benefit that
has been in effect for five years will be worth more in termination in-
surance benefits than a new plan with the same pension benefit level in
effect for only one year. ERISA's failure to follow the Burns definition
of "successor," then, was probably not accidental, but deliberately de-
signed to limit the liability of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
to plan participants whose pension plans have terminated.
E. In Summary
Despite its claims to the contrary,0 9 ERISA clearly does not leave the
federal labor law of collective bargaining intact. ERISA will alter at
least three important aspects of the duty to bargain: the scope of bargain-
ing, the availability of information for collective bargaining over em-
ployee benefits, and a successor employer's duty to bargain with an in-
cumbent union. Moreover, ERISA already has generated debate over
107. Id. § 4022(b) (2), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1322(b) (2).
108. Benefits covered by the insurance protections of ERISA are guaranteed only to
the extent of the greater of: "(A) 20 percent of the amount which, but for the fact
that the plan or amendment has not been in effect for 60 months or more, would be
guaranteed under this section, or (B) $20 per month, multiplied by the number of
years (but not more than 5) the plan or amendment, as the case may be, has been in
effect." Id. § 4022(b) (8), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1322(b) (8).
109. See id. § 514(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(d): "Nothing in this title shall be
construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the
United States (except as provided in sections 111 and 507(b)) or any rule or regula-
tion issued under any such law." ERISA § 111(a) (1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 103(a) (1) (1975),
repealed the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat.
997 (1958), and ERISA § 507(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1147(b) (1975), authorized creation of
new positions within the Department of Labor. By implication, therefore, ERISA dis-
claims any change in federal labor laws.
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the scope of the parties' duty to negotiate midterm contract changes.
Changes necessitated by ERISA may carry ramifications for other parts
of the collective bargaining agreement, and labor and management may
disagree over their responsibility to bargain over such indirectly related
subjects.
In these various ways, ERISA fundamentally affects the collective bar-
gaining relationship regarding employee benefits. The fact that such
effects were unintentional is but a cogent reminder that this statute was
enacted to cover both collectively bargained plans and those established
in other ways. For those plans that were collectively bargained, the par-
ties' fundamental duties to bargain in good faith and to abide by their
agreements must not be forgotten.
II. PENSION PLAN AMENDMENTS RELATED TO ERISA:
THE EXTENT OF THE DUTY To BARGAIN
Many collective bargaining agreements are being opened midterm in
order to make the pension plan changes mandated by ERISA. Midterm
opening poses the question whether the scope of the duty to bargain
extends only to changes required by the Act, or to other proposed col-
lective bargaining agreement amendments as well.
This question arises primarily in two contexts. Employers will propose
plan amendments in areas other than those requiring modification, or in
other sections of the agreement, to seek relief from the higher cost of
employee benefits"' incurred by ERISA compliance."' Alternatively,
a union may see the negotiations over ERISA-mandated changes as an
opportunity to increase their bargaining gains in employee benefits or
other contract areas.
110. For example, a pension plan may have been operating with a 30-year amortiza-
tion period, which exceeds ERISA requirements, but at a funding level below ERISA
standards. The employer may attempt to trade the added costs of funding for relief
in the amortization area, extending the period to 40 years, the maximum allowable
under ERISA § 302(b) (2) (B) (i), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1082(b) (2) (B) (i) (1975). Alternatively,
an employer may propose that additional funding costs be offset by reducing a cost-of-
living allowance formula previously agreed upon.
111. Few plans will escape an increase in costs due to ERISA. Solicitor of Labor
William J. Kilberg outlined three areas of cost impact: "the minimum standards for
participation, vesting and funding; the fiduciary responsibility rules-including the
prohibited transaction restrictions-and the cost of administration, including records and
recordkeeping .... In [the Solicitor's] opinion it is the medium and small plans, which
exceed the big plans in number but cover in the aggregate fewer employees, which
have the most catching up to do." DAILY LAB. REP., Apr. 4, 1975, at A-13.
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Although the desire of the union to maximize gains and the employer's
concern for recouping added costs are understandable, such proposed
midterm changes do not fall within the scope of the duty to bargain. The
legislative history of ERISA, as well as its statutory scheme, demonstrate
that the parties are obliged to bargain only over those changes necessi-
tated by the new law. Traditional labor law instructs that parties cannot
be compelled to bargain midterm on subjects that were discussed in
good faith bargaining during the most recent contract negotiations.
Although labor and management, of course, can agree to discuss what-
ever they wish during the contract term, a refusal by one party to bar-
gain over changes not mandated by ERISA cannot be an unfair labor
practice under the National Labor Relations Act.
A. The Duty To Bargain Midterm
The duty to bargain over employee benefits under ERISA is governed
by the National Labor Relations Act." 2 ERISA states that "[n]othing in
this title shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, -or
supersede any law of the United States ... or any rule or regulation
issued under any such law." I"- This broad declaration encompasses the
National Labor Relations Act, which ERISA does not purport to amend
or repeal.-"4 The definitional sections of ERISA, as well, heed traditional
notions of collective bargaining." 5
The language of the Act and its legislative history evince a congres-
sional recognition that the subjects addressed by ERISA raise bargainable
issues. Congress also considered the special problems caused for collec-
tively bargained employee benefit plans in existence at the time of the
enactment of ERISA. The guidance that the congressional reports pro-
vide to parties engaged in midterm bargaining over changes caused by
ERISA thus is especially persuasive.
112. See notes 7-20 supra & accompanying text.
113. ERISA § 514(d), 29 U.S:C.A. § 1144(d) (1975). See note 109 supra.
114. A basic maxim of statutory construction also prescribes that there is a strong
presumption against repeal by implication, and that new statutes will be construed to
effectuate their operation consistent with previous legislation. 1A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 23.10 at 230-31 (4th ed. C. Sands 1972).
115. See, e.g., ERISA § 3(4), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(4) (1975): "The term 'employee
organization' means any labor union ... which exists for the purpose, in whole or in
part, of dealing with employers concerning an employee benefit plan, or other matters
incidental to employment relationships. .. "
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1. Legislative History
The clearest statement of congressional intent on the scope of the
duty to bargain midterm is contained in the report of the conference
committee, which indicates that the committee envisioned a midterm bar-
gaining duty only as to matters that must be changed for the benefit plan
to comply with the new law.116 The report stated the understanding of
the committee that it would not be an unfair labor practice to refuse to
bargain "regarding matters unrelated to the modification required by
[ERISA]," 117 implying that the parties are required to bargain over sub-
jects "related to" such required modifications. Read broadly to encom-
pass such subjects as reciprocal relief, in areas outside the benefit plan,
from increased employee benefit costs compelled by ERISA, this inter-
pretation arguably would defeat the purpose of ERISA to improve priv-
ate pension plans."" A narrower intent appears more likely in view of
the conferees' earlier statement that the plan "may be reopened solely
for the purpose of allowing the plan to meet the requirements of
[ERISA], without having to be opened for any other purpose." "' The
motivation behind the conference substitute, "that the opening of the
116. The report acknowledges that existing collectively bargained plans are subject to
the participation and vesting requirements in plan years beginning after December 31,
1975, and further states:
However, in order that the opening up of the contract to comply with
the requirements of this bill will not require negotiations with respect to
other matters, the conference substitute provides that a collective bargaining
contract, in existence on January 1, 1974, which does not expire until after
the general effective date for existing plans, may be reopened solely for
the purpose of allowing the plan to meet the requirements of this bill,
without having to be opened for any other purpose. Where it is necessary,
as a result of this bill, to modify an employee benefit plan, it is the con-
ferees' understanding that it is not an unfair labor practice under the
National Labor Relations Act for a party to a collective bargaining
agreenent to refuse to bargain regarding matters unrelated to the modifica-
tion required by this bill, provided this refusal is not otherwise an unfair
labor practice. In addition, the changes required to be made in a plan are
not themselves to be treated as constituting the expiration of a contract for
purposes of any other provisions of this bill which depend on the date of
the expiration of a contract.
COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, JOINT ExPLANATORY STATEMENT, H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 266 (1974) (emphasis supplied) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE COM-
MITTEE STATEMENT].
117. Id. (emphasis supplied).
118. See ERISA § 2(c), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001(c) (1975); note 126 infra & accompanying
text.
119. CONFERENCE COMMITTEE STATEMENT, supra note 116, at 266.
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contract to comply with the requirements of [ERISA] will not require
negotiations with respect to other matters -,20 sustains a more strin-
gent interpretation of "related matters."
Congressional consideration of added costs from ERISA-mandated
changes also suggest that the legislators did not envision required mid-
term bargaining over cost relief.' 21 They weighed the fear that increased
costs would discourage the growth and improvement of private pension
plans, and modified the cost impact of ERISA at the legislative stage.
Through compromise amendments, 22 Congress already has given em-
ployers cost relief under ERISA.
The lawmakers also proceeded on the assumption that plan changes
following ERISA would improve pension plans. 12 An amendment to
improve vesting provisions could not be conditioned on downgrading in
another area; Congress did not hinge plan improvements on relinquish-
120. Id.
121. The House dismissed this problem, noting, "any added cost attributable to the
imposition of vesting and funding standards will inure directly to the benefit of the
participants in each plan in the form of increased availability of benefits and added
security." H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4643. Clearly, no reduction in the coverage of the plan or in the protection of
other provisions was envisioned by Congress as a result of ERISA.
Arguably, there is historical support for the view that compensation for cost increases
could be broached in negotiations for a new contract. The proposed three-year delay
for vesting and funding requirements in collectively bargained plans were rationalized
in part "to make provision for additional costs which may be experienced, and to permit
negotiated agreements to transpire ... " S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4872.
122. For example, bill provisions calling for earlier eligibility standards were abandoned
in view of the unwarranted additional cost. See S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong, 1st Sess., in
1974 U.S. CODE Co-NG. & AD. NEws 4855; H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4689; S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4905. Similarly, immediate and full vesting was abandoned
because of its substantial cost. Id. Rather, the alternative chosen involved cost that the
Congress expected to be moderate. Id. at 4906; I-.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4691.
The Committee recognized that unduly large cost hikes could impede the growth and
improvement of the private pension system. "For this reason, in the case of those re-
quirements which add to the cost of financing retirement plans, the Committee has
sought to adopt provisions which strike a balance between providing meaningful reform
and keeping costs within reasonable limits." S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4904. See also H.R. Rep. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4671; S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NvEws 4890.
123. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4844, 4849, 4890.
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ment of previously achieved gains. 124 In predicting the bill's revenue
effect on the federal treasury, Congress made the explicit assumption that
benefits would not be reduced. 2  This implies that portions of the plan
that afford greater protection to benefits, such as a shorter amortization
period, also would be insulated from an employer's insistence on down-
grading in other areas.
2. Statutory Scheme and Purpose of ERISA
The congressional intent that the duty of midterm mandatory bar-
gaining be limited in scope to those changes that must be made to satisfy
ERISA is demonstrated also by the purpose and statutory scheme of
the Act. The explicit policy of ERISA, "to protect . . . the interests of
participants in private pension plans and their beneficiaries by improving
the equitable character and the soundness of such plans," 126 should bar
employer efforts to force midterm bargaining over changes that would
weaken employee benefit protection in exchange for compliance with the
new law in other areas. Moreover, certain provisions of ERISA refer to
a midterm bargaining obligation that is limited in scope. The vesting pro-
visions of the Act specify that changes in a pension plan, incorporated
within a collective bargaining agreement, made "solely to conform [the
plan] to any requirement contained in this Act" will not be considered a
termination of the collective bargaining agreement. 127 Collectively bar-
gained plans receive similar treatment under section 306(c), which sets
effective dates for meeting funding requirements. 28 These sections,
124. "If employers respond to more comprehensive coverage, vesting and funding
rules by decreasing benefits under existing plans or slowing the rate of formation of new
plans, little if anything would be gained from the standpoint of securing broader use of
employee pensions and related plans." S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4904.
125. Congress estimated revenue effects first assuming that additional employer
pension contributions could be a substitute for cash wages, and then assuming the
additional contributions would be an addition to cash wages. "The estimate under
both cases assumes that benefits under pension plans are not decreased and that no
benefit increases are foregone as a result of the bill." Id. at 4940. See also H.R. REP. No.
807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4738.
The isolated suggestion to the contrary, that federal revenue loss could be minimized
"to the extent that plans adjust their benefit levels to absorb the increased employer
costs resulting from the [minimum vesting] requirement" is so outweighed by other
legislative history and the purpose clause of ERISA as to have negligible import. S. REP.
No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4922.
126. ERISA § 2 (c), 29 U.S.C.A. 5 1001 (c) (1975) (emphasis supplied).
127. Id. § 211(c) (1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1061(c) (1). See note 116 supra & accompanying
text.
128. ERISA § 306(c) (1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1086(c) (1) (1975), provides: "In the case of
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therefore, contemplate that collective bargaining agreements will be
opened during their terms only to change language that must be amended
to comply with ERISA.
Section 205 (h) of ERISA also suggests this conclusion, albeit by nega-
tive implication. In its treatment of the joint and survivor annuity, the
section explicitly provides that a plan may take into account, in "any
equitable fashion," the increased costs resulting from the provision of the
joint and survivor election for annuity benefits.' 29 Although this men-
tion may merely recognize that a joint and survivor option often neces-
sitates a cost assessment on an individual participant exercising the op-
tion, section 205 (h) is nonetheless the only reference in ERISA to
costs. 30 The failure of Congress to specify that cost considerations may
be taken into account in other sections of ERISA suggests that the par-
ties to a collective bargaining agreement cannot be compelled midterm
to discuss costs of other ERISA-mandated changes.
The statutory scheme, purpose, and legislative history of ERISA indi-
cate that the duty to bargain midterm is limited to subjects involving
only those plan changes that must be made to comply with the Act. That
intention should be respected by courts and by parties engaged in mid-
term collective bargaining over ERISA-mandated contract changes. A
party cannot be required to bargain over modifications related to the
added costs of complying with ERISA, or over other changes not re-
quired by ERISA.
B. Disagreement over the Scope of Midterm Bargaining
Despite strong indicia from the language of the Act and its legislative
history that the duty to bargain is to extend only to changes required
by ERISA, the parties may disagree on the scope of mandatory bargain-
a plan maintained on January 1, 1974, pursuant to one or more agreements which the
Secretary [of Labor] finds to be collective bargaining agreements between employee
representatives and one or more employers, this part shall apply only with respect to
plan years beginning after the earlier of the date specified in subparagraph (A) or (B)
of section 211(c) (1)." These dates are the last of the expiration dates for the collec-
tively bargained agreements or December 31, 1980.
129. Id. § 205(h), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1055(h). The Secretary of the Treasury determines
equitability under this section.
130. The statute precisely refers to adjustment for "any increased cost resulting from
providing joint and survivor annuity benefits under an election made under sub-
section (c)." Id. The legislative history confirms that this section was treated differently
from the rest of the bill with respect to cost considerations. See H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., in 1974 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 4733; S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., in 1974 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. Naws 5061.
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ing. Several possible consequences confront parties engaged in a dispute
over the changes ERISA entails, the most significant being unfair labor
practice charges, arbitration suits under section 301 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act and section 502 of ERISA, and resort to strike.
1. Unfair Labor Practice Charges
An unfair labor practice charge related to ERISA-induced bargaining
could arise in several ways. An employer might unilaterally change a pen-
sion plan without discussion with the union, clearly an unfair labor prac-
tice under NLRB v. Katz.lal Alternatively, the union could refuse to
agree to any changes in the plan even though its inaction would result in
a nonconforming plan; this too would constitute an unfair labor prac-
tice.l' 2 Most predictable, however, is a disagreement over the scope of
bargaining in which the parties must engage. Under ERISA and tradi-
tional principles of collective bargaining, of course, neither the refusal of
a union to consider changes other than those mandated by ERISA nor
the refusal to accept an employer's proposals unnecessary to satisfy
ERISA should be an unfair labor practice.13 3 Although both parties may
agree to go beyond the narrow scope of ERISA-necessitated alterations,
they may not be forced to do so.
The employer, however, can make unilateral changes after having en-
gaged in good faith bargaining on a mandatory subject to the point of
impasse. 3 4 ERISA does not change this basic precept but restricts its ex-
ercise in the pension field. The restrictions on benefit reduction along
with the Act's funding requirements limit the range of unilateral employ-
er action to offset increased costs in the plan.:"' And, of course, ERISA
narrows the options a plan can use and still satisfy its requirements. These
constraints, as a result, may force the employer to seek changes outside
the pension plan to achieve monetary savings.
The specter of compulsory deferral to arbitration under the doctrine
of Collyer Insulated Wire36 will haunt a union seeking relief from the
131. 369 U.S. 736 (1962). See note 10 supra & accompanying text.
132. If the plan did not conform to ERISA and the employer thereby was dis-
qualified from tax benefits for its contributions, the employer could argue that the basis
of its agreement to maintain a pension plan had been voided by the union's action.
133. See notes 112-30 supra & accompanying text.
134. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 741-43 (1962).
135. See notes 22-35 supra & accompanying text.
136. 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971). Collyer announced a rule of deferral
to arbitration when "the breadth of the arbitration provision [in the collective bargaining
agreement] makes clear that the parties intended to make the grievance and arbitration
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National Labor Relations Board for an employer's refusal to bargain
over ERISA changes. If the collective bargaining agreement contains
both a provision regarding the scope of reopening for midterm negotia-
tions and a broad arbitration clause, the Board may decide that a decision
on the scope of the midterm negotiation provision properly lies with an
arbitrator. Again, the Board may opt for arbitration of the contract,
rather than order the parties to bargain, if, in violation of ERISA, an
employer fails to satisfy the funding obligations of a collective bargain-
ing agreement. Of course, if this is a bona fide option, a party may choose
arbitration rather than resorting to the Board.
2. Adjudication in Federal Courts
Disagreements over the scope of ERISA-related bargaining also may
be resolved in federal courts, indirectly under section 502 of ERISA3 7
and directly under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act.138
If an employer's bargaining position or unilateral action denies a par-
ticipant or beneficiary any rights under ERISA or under the terms of
the applicable employee benefit plan, a suit could be maintained pur-
suant to section 502 (a) (1) (B)' 3 9 or section 502 (a) (3) of ERISA.140 A
union thus indirectly could force the employer to comply with ERISA
provisions by suing for damages or an injunction through a plan partici-
pant who is a union member. Alternatively, a union successfully could
resist an employer's attempts to gain cost relief in some portions of the
plan in exchange for added funding costs by suing through a participant,
beneficiary, or fiduciary to enforce the more comprehensive terms of the
plan. 41
If the employer seeks to evade a pension plan incorporated in a col-
lective bargaining agreement 42 that extends greater protection than
machinery the exclusive forum for resolving contract disputes." The Board then will
dismiss an unfair labor practice charge. Id. at 839, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1933.
137. ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132 (1975).
139. LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
139. ERISA § 502(a) (1) (B), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a) (1) (B) (1975), authorizes suits by
plan participants or beneficiaries "to recover benefits due .... to enforce his rights
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his right to future benefits. .. "
140. Id. § 502 (a) (3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132 (a) (3), authorizes suits by a participant,
beneficiary, or fiduciary to enjoin violations of the Act or seek other appropriate
equitable relief.
141. Id. § 502(a) (3) (B) (ii), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a) (3) (B) (ii). See note 140 supra.
142. The collective bargaining agreement need not explicitly incorporate the benefit
plan; section 301 covers suits based on the plan if it is referred to in the agreement or
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ERISA, the union could pursue arbitration to enforce the employer's
contractual obligations. This later might entail a suit under section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act. Governed by the federal com-
mon law of labor contracts,144 a section 301 suit enables the union to
assure retention of previously gained pension improvements that exceed
the minimum protections set forth in ERISA. The union could maintain
this action even though the employer's stance also constituted an unfair
labor practice. 45
3. Strikes and Injunctions
Although as a practical matter a strike over a pension dispute alone
is an unlikely phenomenon, it nevertheless could occur in conjunction
with a dispute over the scope of required pension bargaining. The threat
of injunction, however, limits the legal strike option under no-strike
and broad compulsory arbitration clauses found in the majority of
modern collective bargaining agreements. The federal courts have yet to
interpret these clauses in the context of bargaining over ERISA, but
analogies can be drawn from litigation of similar clauses in other areas of
labor-management relations.
Whether a strike caused by a dispute over ERISA-related bargaining
can be enjoined will depend upon the basis for the work stoppage and
upon the scope of the parties' agreement to arbitrate disputes. An em-
ployer confronted by a strike may seek an injunction in federal courts
under the authority of Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770. 14
is intended to implement an agreement reached through bargaining. See Goetz,
Developing Federal Labor Law of Welfare and Pension Plans, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 911,
937-38 (1970).
143. LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
144. Section 301 was intended to make collective bargaining contracts enforceable by
either party. Federal law governs, though suit may be brought in federal or state
court. See, e.g, Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
Congress intended that ERISA be guided by federal common law developed under-
section 301. The conference committee report declared that actions brought under
section 502 of ERISA in federal or state court to enforce benefit rights or to re-
cover benefits outside of Title I of ERISA would be governed by federal, not state,
law and "are to be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States in similar
fashion to those brought under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of
1947." CONFERENCE COMMITTEE STATEMENT, supra note 116, at 327.
145. A section 301 suit can be maintained against the employer for breach of the
collective bargaining agreement even though the employer's alleged conduct is con-
cededly an unfair labor practice. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
146. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
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For the employer to prevail, the collective bargaining agreement must
contain a broad compulsory arbitration clause and the dispute must be
"arguably arbitrable." 147 If, however, the dispute concerns proposed
alterations to conform the plan to ERISA requirements, the union proba-
bly could successfully resist the injunction and any subsequent suit for
damages. 48 An alteration of the contract presents an issue for interest
arbitration, not for the grievance arbitration contemplated by Boys
Markets, because no interpretation of existing contract language would
be at issue.149
147. The rationale of Boys Markets permits a strike to be enjoined if the collective
bargaining agreement contains a no-strike clause, if the dispute over which the strike
occurs is within the scope of the arbitration clause, and if the employer can prove he
will be injured irreparably if an injunction does not issue. A collective bargaining
agreement need not contain an express no-strike clause for a Boys Markets injunction
to issue; a court will imply an obligation not to strike from a clause in the contract
calling for grievance arbitration, and provide injunctive relief if the clause is reasonably
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Gateway Coal Co. v.
United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
This rationale, that a compulsory arbitration clause within a collective bargaining
agreement that could be enforced against an employer in a section 301 suit also should
be enforceable against a union by enjoining its strike, is based on the presumption in
favor of arbitrability of labor disputes first expressed in the "Steelworkers Trilogy":
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp, 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navig. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
however, ruled in Teledyne Wis. Motor v. UAW Local 283, 91 L.R.R.M. 2313 (7th
Cir. 1976), that a Boys Market injunction will not issue where the court faces neither
a mandatory arbitration clause, as in Inland Steel Co. v. UMW Local 1545, 505 F.2d
293 (7th Cir. 1974), nor an express "no strike" clause, as in Avco Corp. v. UAW Local
787, 459 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1972). Where no express "no strike" clause exists, the quid
pro quo to infer a mandatory arbitration clause is lacking. Teledyne Wis. Motor v.
UAW Local 283, supra, at 2316. But where an express "no strike" clause is present, the
court may decide that a dispute is "arguably arbitrable." See, e.g., Monongahela Power
Co. v. IBEW Local 2332, 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1973); cf. NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v.
Automotive Chauffers Local 926, 502 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049
(1974). But see Parade Pubs., Inc. v. Philadelphia Mailers Local 14, 459 F.2d 369 (3d Cir.
1972); Amstar Corp. v. Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972) (refusing to enjoin
strikes under Boys Markets when the legality of the strike itself is the issue sought to be
arbitrated).
148. Suits for damages can be maintained under LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970),
due to alleged losses from a strike during the term of a collective bargaining agreement
containing a no-strike pledge. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369
U.S. 95 (1962).
149. In Boys Markets the Court emphasized: 'We deal only with the situation in
which a collective-bargaining contract contains a mandatory grievance adjustment
or arbitration procedure." 398 U.S. at 253 (emphasis supplied).
The union could rely also on the rationale presented in NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352
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Regardless of the availability of an injunction, employees who strike
over an employer's refusal to make ERISA-mandated changes or to re-
tain plan provisions exceeding the protections of ERISA should be en-
tided to reinstatement. If the employer has refused to bargain in good
faith, their strike would be against a substantial unfair labor practice,
and thus their jobs should be protected.150 Moreover, striking employees
who also are plan participants would be sheltered by section 510 of
ERISA, which prohibits reprisals against any plan participant or bene-
ficiary who exercises any right under the statute or who acts to attain
such a right.' 5'
The various remedies available to parties engaged in a conflict over
ERISA-related bargaining are those of more traditional areas of labor
law. The relationship between ERISA and procedures for resolution of
conflicts over a labor agreement, though not yet clarified, will be de-
veloped within the framework of the National Labor Relations Act.
III. TERMINATION OF PENSION PLANS:
ACCOMMODATING ERISA WITH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
Labor and management traditionally have been obligated to bargain
over the decision to terminate a pension plan, and have been bound by
the terms relating to pension plan terminations of their collective bar-
gaining agreements. Although ERISA does not change these obligations
expressly, the pension plan termination portions of the Act inject a
volatile new element into the labor-management relationship.
U.S. 282 (1957), in which the Court stated: "It would be anomalous for Congress to
recognize such a duty [to bargain over modifications when the contract contemplates
bargaining] and at the same time deprive the union of the strike threat which, together
with 'the occasional strike itself, is the force depended upon to facilitate arriving at
satisfactory settlements."' Id. at 291 (footnote omitted), quoting SUBCoMMITTEE ON
LABOR & LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, 82d CONG., IsT SESs., REPORT ON FACTORS IN
SuccEssFuL. COLLECTVE BARGAINING UNDER S. REs. 71, at 7 (Comm. Print 1951). Because
Congress has compelled the reopening of contracts at midterm to comply with
ERISA, arguably it cannot be implied that it left the union weaponless in those negotia-
tions.
150. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956), held that employees engaged
in a strike against an employer's unfair labor practice will keep their status as em-
ployees, and stated: "In the absence of some contractual or statutory provision to the
contrary, petitioners' unfair labor practices provide adequate ground for the orderly
strike that occurred here. Under those circumstances, the striking employees do not
lose their status and are entitled to reinstatement with back pay, even if replacements
for them have been made." Id. at 278 (footnote omitted). The strike at issue in
Mastro, the Court emphasized, however, "was not to terminate or modify the con-
tract." Id. at 286 (footnote omitted).
151. ERISA S 510, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1140 (1975).
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Case law prior to ERISA prohibited an employer from terminating
an employee benefit plan, whether during negotiations or the term of
the contract, without first bargaining to impasse with the union. 152 This
rule prevailed even when the pension plan was not formally incorporated
into the collective bargaining agreement but existed only as an estab-
lished practice. 153 The terms of the collective bargaining agreement
governed the manner of plan termination, including distribution of assets
upon liquidation. The federal government imposed only meager restric-
tions on termination that were poorly enforced. 15 4
Pension plan terminations often occurred in conjunction with the
relocation or cessation of an employer's operations. 15  Because such a
drastic change in business conduct frequently was occasioned by the
severe financial difficulties of the company, the effect on employee bene-
fits was often catastrophic. Indeed, reports of pension rights wiped out
152. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962); Borden, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 1170,
1174-75, 80 L.R.R.M. 1240, 1243 (1972).
153. See Reapp Typographical Service, Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 792, 83 L.R.R.M. 1604 (1973)
(termination of insurance policies).
154. Compliance with two requirements regarding plan termination was necessary to
avoid retroactive disqualification of the pension plan from the favorable tax treatment
of section 401, INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954. The plan termination had to be motivated by
business necessity and the assets of the plan, upon termination, had to be allocated in
a nondiscriminatory manner. See Comment, The Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974: Policies and Problems, 26 SYRACUSE L. REv. 539, 607-08 (1975).
155. An employer may not be forced to bargain over the decision to sell its operation,
such decision being "at the very core of entrepreneurial control," General Motors
Corp., GMC Truck & Coach Div., 191 N.L.R.B. 951, 952, 77 L.R.R.M. 1537, 1539 (1971),
enforced sub nont. UAW v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See Kingwood
Mining Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 844, 86 L.R.R.M. 1203 (1974). An employer must bargain,
however, over the impact of that decision upon its workers, before the decision is made.
See, e.g., Arnold Graphic Indus., Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. 327, 329, 84 L.R.R.M. 1343, 1346
(1973). A failure to bargain over the impact of a plant closing can result in a back
pay award. See, e.g., Morrison Cafeterias Consol., Inc. v. NLRB, 431 F.2d 254 (8th
Cir. 1970); Electronic Prods. Int'l Corp., 208 N.L.R.B. 350, 85 L.R.R.M. 1268 (1974);
Royal Norton Mfg. Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 489, 77 L.R.R.M. 1022 (1971); Ozark Trailers,
Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 990, 63 L.R.R.M. 1045 (1966).
An employer is required to bargain over the decision to relocate an operation, as well
as over its effects on employees. Royal Typewriter Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 1006, 85 L.R.R.M.
1501 (1974); American Needle & Novelty Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 534, 84 L.R.R.M. 1526
(1973). See also Rovins & Rosen, Labor Law Obligations of Parties to the Sale of a
Business, 25 LABoR L.J. 231 (1974); Rubinstein, Plant Relocation and Its Effects on
Labor-Management Relations, 18 LABOR LJ. 544 (1967); Schwarz, Plant Relocation or
Partial Termination-The Duty To Decision-Bargain, 39 FoRDHAm L. REv. 81 (1970);
Swift, Plant Relocation: Catching Up With the Runaway Shop, 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L.
Rv. 1135 (1973); 25 WAsH. & LEE L. Rv. 96 (1968).
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after years of productive work acted as an impetus to the lobbying that
resulted in ERISA.1 6
In plan terminations prior to ERISA, strong contract language and
156. Characteristically, a failing company would fall considerably behind in contribu-
dons to the pension fund, thereby jeopardizing benefits. If the company were on an in-
secure financial footing, this deficit often was not recovered by the time the company de-
clared bankruptcy. Since the Supreme Court, in United States v. Embassy Restaurant,
Inc., 359 U.S. 29 (1959), held that an employer's contributions to a union welfare fund
did not constitute "wages" within the meaning of Bankruptcy Act § 64a(2), 11 U.S.C.
S 104a(2) (1970), and thus were not entitled to a second priority in the bankruptcy
distribution, benefits often were lost altogether when the employer declared bank-
ruptcy. The Court also denied section 64a(2) priority to employer contributions to
a union annuity plan in Joint Indus. Bd. of the Elec. Indus. v. United States, 391 U.S. 224
(1968). Under the plan, the funds were payable to an employee only upon his depar-
ture from the industry; for this reason, the court held that the fundamental purpose
of section 64a(2), to secure to workers money directly due them in back wages, would
not be satisfied by according a priority to a claim for overdue contributions to the
plan. The Proposed Bankruptcy Act section 4-405 (a) (4) would overrule Embassy
Restaurant and joint Industry Board by allowing, within certain limits, a fourth priority
in the bankruptcy distribution to claims for contributions to employee pension and
similar benefit plans. See Proposed Bankruptcy Act § 4-405 (a) (4), in II REPORT OF THE
COMMIssION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
Under ERISA, a lien, equal in status to a federal tax lien, arises in favor of the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation for any liability to the corporation occasioned
by the employer's bankruptcy. ERISA § 4068(c), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1368(c) (1975). Beyond
that debt to the Corporation, bankruptcy courts probably will limit the enforceability
of liability arising from the collective bargaining agreement. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit has held that a bankruptcy court may grant a petition in a Chapter
XI proceeding to reject a collective bargaining agreement as an onerous executory
contract under section 313(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 713(1) (1970). The
court warned, however, that this judgment could not be made without seriously taking
into account the loss of employee rights and benefits under the agreement. The Second
Circuit remanded the case to the district court to make a determination on the petition
based on a consideration of such losses and procedures for termination of collective
bargaining agreements under section 8(d) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
Iron Workers, Local 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975),
rev'g & remanding 381 F. Supp. 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See generally THE DEV LOPING
LABOR LAW 816-18 (C. Morris ed. 1971).
A conflict over pension rights jurisdiction between the bankruptcy courts and federal
district courts seems inevitable. Bankruptcy courts claim broad jurisdiction and powers
under section 2 of the Bankruptcy Act. 11 U.S.C. § 11 (1970). Yet section 4042(f)
of ERISA provides that upon the filing of an application by the Pension Benefit Guar-
anty Corporation for appointment to a trustee or the issuance of a decree to terminate
a plan, that court has exclusive jurisdiction over the plan and its property. ERISA
§ 4042(f), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1342(f) (1975). To the extent consistent with the purposes
of this section, the court is given the powers of a bankruptcy court under chapter 10
of the Bankruptcy Act. Pending an adjudication on plan termination under ERISA
section 4042 (c), "the court shall stay ... any pending bankruptcy, mortgage foreclosure,
equity receivership, or other proceeding to reorganize, conserve, or liquidate the plan
or its property. . . ." ERISA § 4042(f), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1342(f) (1975). In addition,
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the bargaining power of a union often formed the only effective shield
between an older worker and total disaster. Although the harsh realities
of a business shutdown or a relocated shop have meant severe hardship
to the workers left jobless, unions have been able to negotiate and en-
force contractual obligations that netted benefits beyond those initially
offered by employers. 15' The termination provisions of ERISA have
fortified most unions' bargaining positions in plan terminations. By as-
suring certain pension rights, however, ERISA also limits a union's
the court may stay any proceeding to enforce a lien against property of the plan or any
other suit against the plan. Id.
157. In the past, for example, a contractual promise by the employer to provide
pensions or to fund a plan on an "actuarily sound" basis has resulted in a funding obli-
gation extending beyond the termination of the plan. See, e.g., International Ass'n of
Machinists, Lodge 1194 v. Sargent Indus., 522 F.2d 280 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'g in part
& rev'g in part International Ass'n of Machinists, Lodge 1194 v. Garwood Indus, Inc.,
368 F. Supp. 357 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Briggs v. Michigan Tool Co., 369 F. Supp. 920
(E.D. Mich. 1974). Cf. Clark v. Kraftco Corp., 510 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1975). The obli-
gations under a collective bargaining agreement may be held to run for its entire term,
despite a midterm cessation of operations. See UAW v. White Motor Corp., 505 F.2d
1193 (8th Cir. 1974), enforcing 61 Lab. Arb. 320 (Seitz, 1973), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct.
1588 (1975). Cf. Metal Polishers, Local 44 v. Viking Equip. Co., 278 F.2d 142 (3d
Cir. 1960) (per curiam) (employer's move did not terminate the collective bargaining
contract). But see Knoll v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 465 F.2d 1128 (3d Cir. 1972), aff'g
325 F. Supp. 666 (E.D. Pa. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1126 (1973); Oddie v. Ross
Gear & Tool Co., 305 F.2d 143 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 941 (1962) (seniority
rights not transferred upon plant relocation); Cona v. Jim Valter Corp., 83 L.R.R.M.
2541 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (group insurance coverage not extended beyond termination
of collective bargaining agreement); Baake v. General Am. Transp. Corp., 351 F.
Supp. 962 (N.D. ill. 1972) (employer's obligation limited to amounts paid to pension
fund).
The duty to provide health and life insurance may survive the expiration of the
labor agreement, Operating Eng'rs Local 9 v. Siegrist Constr. Co., 458 F.2d 1313
(10th Cir. 1972); American Standard, Inc. v. UAXV Local 667, 57 Lab. Arb. 698
(Warns, 1971); cf. Upholsterers Int'l Union v. American Pad & Textile Co., 372 F.2d
427 (6th Cir. 1967) (retired employee covered despite expiration of contract with
employer). See also Bressette v. International Talc Co., 91 L.R.R.M. 2077, 2080 (2d Cir.
1975). A plant shutdown and expiration of the collective bargaining agreement do not
relieve the employer from arbitrating employees rights to severance pay. Bakery &
Confectionery Workers, Local 358 v. Nolde Bros., Inc., 78 CCH LAB. CAS. f 11,221 (4th
Cir. 1975). The failure to make promised contributions to an employee benefit plan can
constitute a violation of section 8(a) (5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970),
American Needle & Novelty Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 534, 84 L.R.R.M. 1526 (1973); Latin
Quarter Cafe, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 997, 76 L.R.R.M. 1552 (1970), as well as section 8(d) of
the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d), as a failure to abide by contract terms.
Termination must follow the language of the collective bargaining agreement even
though the bargaining representative has changed. United Brick & Clay Workers V.
UMW District 50, 439 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'g 315 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Mo. 1970)
(loss of majority status by a union in favor of another did not terminate a pension
agreement).
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flexibility in negotiating a plant closing agreement.1 8 Because a "report-
able event could trigger pension termination by the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation, 5 9 an employer's obligation to bargain over the
decision to terminate a pension plan should extend to a duty to bargain
over the "reportable event."
Now that the requirements of ERISA for plan termination and insur-
ance coverage apply, employers can be expected to argue that the new
statute renders bargaining obligations and contract and plan language
concerning pension plan terminations ineffective and superfluous. Such a
position is not sustainable. Moreover, insofar as pension plan language is
not inconsistent with ERISA, it should remain legally enforceable as part
158. In a plant shutdown or relocation, the union may attempt to bargain for com-
pensation not provided by the collective bargaining agreement. Additional severance
pay is a common form of attempted consolation given to a jobless worker. If a
company maintains other facilities, the union may seek concessions to enable workers
to transfer with application of past seniority at the new plant, or provision for a family
moving allowance. The union, as an alternative, may be able to negotiate employee
health insurance for an additional six months beyond the term of the contract. The
compensation a union may be able to win in negotiations with a relocated employer
can take many forms, depending upon the parties' past bargaining relationship and
their present situations.
The union often has faced competing interests of retirees and active workers in plant
relocations and shutdowns. Given a fund that is too small for all to share equally, the
union must give certain groups of workers priority over others in the negotiations
surrounding relocation or termination; as long as the union does not breach its duty
of fair representation, however, all those affected by the employer's action need not
be treated equally. For example, in Smith v. DCA Food Indus., Inc., 269 F. Supp. 863,
867 n.5 (D. Md. 1967), a union and an employer agreed to distribute pension plan
assets to provide for employees over age 60 with 15 years minimum service, which
resulted in nothing at all for the other employees. This arrangement was sustained. See
also Bosi v. USM Corp., 90 L.R.R.M. 2867 (D.NJ. 1975).
Afforded a "wide range of reasonableness," union action that is not arbitrary, discrimi-
natory or in bad faith will be insulated against a claim for breach of the duty of fair
representations. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 44 U.S.L.W. 4299 (U.S. Mar. 3,
1976). See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
The standards set out in ERISA for pension plans to qualify for termination insurance
and tax benefits will limit the amount of discrimination permissible in a pension plan.
The stipulation of minimums for much of a plan's substance will help prevent possible
abuses by bargainers. Although the complete favoritism for older employees and
retirees permitted by Smith and Bosi is a relic of the past, the sections of ERISA
regarding benefit forfeitability and priorities in assets allocation will tip the balance
in favor of retirees and those with vested pension rights in a plant relocation against
younger active employees who might have gained reemployment opportunities or addi-
tional severance pay.
159. This would include, for example, a long term layoff of 20 percent or more of
an employer's work force who are also pension plan participants. See note 167 infra &
accompanying text.
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of a collective bargaining contract binding both parties for the duration
of its term. In this way the agreement can complement the basic safe-
guards contained in ERISA to achieve the maximum protection of em-
ployee benefits.
A. ERISA's Termination Scheme: Potential Conflict with Collective
Bargaining Agreements
The termination of a pension plan places the potential disjunctures
of ERISA and the collective bargaining agreement in sharp relief. Tide
IV of ERISA establishes a scheme of partial pension insurance adminis-
tered by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. 6, A pension plan
may be terminated under certain conditions by the plan administrator, 6'
or by the Corporation on its own initiative. 16 2 Once terminated, benefits
in a qualified plan will be insured to a limited extent. The power of the
Corporation to terminate a plan relates to a concern for limiting its lia-
bilities as an insurer. For this and other reasons, a termination under
ERISA should be dispositive of the parties' rights to benefits only insofar
as those rights are protected by the statute. When a collective bargaining
agreement affords further protection, its provisions still should be hon-
ored after the employer's obligations under ERISA have been met.
1. Administrator Termination
A plan administrator may terminate a plan by filing a notice of termi-
nation in conformity with the requirements of section 4041(a) of the
Act.'63 The statute does not specify events that can result in a termina-
tion by an administrator, or the method whereby the termination deci-
sion may be made.6 By implication, therefore, the administrator is to be
guided by the applicable provisions of the plan or the collective bar-
gaining agreement, and the duty to bargain concerning the decision to
terminate the plan also should continue to apply. This provision for ad-
ministrator termination, containing no substantive guidance to parties
with a collectively bargained plan, seems aimed particularly at plans
that were established through other means. Thus section 4041 should
160. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation was created pursuant to ERISA
S 4002, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1302 T1975).
161. Id. § 4041, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1341.
162. Id. § 4042, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1342.
163. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1341(a) (1974).
164. See In re Trustees of Joint Welfare Fund, Operating Eng'rs, Local 14, 88
L.R.R.M. 3262 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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have no effect on the initial stages in the termination of a pension plan
that is governed by negotiated language.'65
2. Termination by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
Unlike the administrator of a collectively bargained plan, however,
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation is not directly circumscribed
in its actions by any contract between labor and management. ERISA
provides that the Corporation may act on its own to terminate a plan.
Under section 4042 of the Act the Corporation enjoys extensive powers
to terminate any plan upon a determination that the minimum funding
standards have not been met, the plan cannot pay benefits when due, a
reportable event as described in the Act has occurred, or continuation of
the plan would cause an unreasonable longrun loss to the Corporation
with respect to the plan. 66 Thus the Corporation can terminate a plan
if 20 percent of the work force is laid off long enough to cease being
plan participants,'17 even though the parties to an applicable collective
bargaining agreement never have agreed to terminate the plan under such
circumstances.
However, though the termination power of the Corporation is exten-
sive, its guarantee of benefits is not. By statute, the insuriance guarantee
is limited to nonforfeitable benefits 6 8 of qualified plans. 69 A maximum
165. Section 4041 prescribes the steps an administrator must take once the decision
to terminate has been made. ERISA § 4041, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (1975). Moreover, the
plan, once terminated, would be subject to the provisions regulating assets allocation
(which may differ significantly from plan language) set forth in section 4044, 29
U.S.C.A. § 1344 (1975), and the regulations thereunder. Proposed regulations for sec-
tion 4044 are set out at 40 Fed. Reg. 51368-73 (1975).
166. ERISA §§ 4042(a) (1)-(4), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1342(a) (1)-(4) (1975).
167. A reportable event that could lead to plan termination occurs "when the number
of active participants is less than 80 percent of the number of such participants at the
beginning of the plan year, or is less than 75 percent of the number of such par-
ticipants at the beginning of the previous plan year." Id. § 4043(b)(3), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 1343 (b) (3). The 20 percent layoff rate appears again to gauge the employer's liability
for withdrawal under sections 4062, 4063, 4064, and 4065. See id. § 4062 (e), 29 U.S.C.A.
9 1362(e). Were this provision for termination by the Corporation strictly enforced, in
a recessionary economy the existence of many plans would be threatened, particularly in
industries characteristically affected first, such as the automobile and steel industries.
168. Id. § 4022(a), 29 U.S.C.A. 1322(a). The nonforfeitable benefits are those that
are nonforfeitable under the terms of a plan, other than those that become nonforfeitable
solely because of plan termination. Thus, a worker without vested benefits under the
plan also will receive nothing from the Corporation.
169. To be qualified for Corporation coverage, a plan must either have:
in practice met the requirements of Part I of subchapter D of chapter 3 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (as in effect for the preceding 5 plan
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value is set for "basic benefits," 170 but as a practical matter, few par-
ticipants in hourly workers' plans ever will approach those upper limits.
The statute also limits the guaranteed benefits to benefits in effect for
five years, with a pro rata guarantee for more recently won benefits.
Thus, a new benefit is guaranteed only to the extent of the greater
amount of either $20 a month or 20 percent of the amount that would
be guaranteed but for the fact that the plan or amendment has not been
in effect for five years, multiplied by the number of years (not exceed-
ing five) that the plan or plan amendment has been in effect.171 Under
the first formulation, a typical plan that has benefit increases negotiated
every three years will have the new levels guaranteed only to the extent
of three years times $20, or $60, assuming termination took place at the
contract's expiration. Alternatively, a benefit level in effect for one year
would be 20 percent guaranteed, one in effect for two years would
be 40 percent guaranteed, and so forth, up to a benefit in effect
for five years, which would be insured 100 percent. Optimally, then,
the Corporation will guarantee payment of the basic benefit to which a
recipient would have been entitled five years ago, plus a prorated share
years of the plan) applicable to plans described in paragraph (2) for the
preceding 5 years; or (2) . . . been determined by the Secretary of the
Treasury to be, a plan described in section 401 (a) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, or which meets, or has been determined by the Secretary of
the Treasury to meet, the requirements of section 404(a) (2) of such Code.
ERISA § 4021(a), 29 U.S.C.A. 1321(a) (1975).
170. The basic insured benefit is limited by id. § 4022(b) (3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1322(b) (3),
which provides:
The amount of monthly benefits ... provided by a plan, which are guaran-
teed under this section with respect to a participant, shall not have an
actuarial value which exceeds the actuarial value of a monthly benefit in the
form of a life annuity commencing at age 65 equal to the lesser of-
(A) his average monthly gross income from his employer during the 5
consecutive calendar year period (or, if less, during the number of calendar
years in such period in which he actively participates in the plan) during
which his gross income from that employer was greater than during any
other such period with that employer determined by dividing 1/12 :E the
sum of all such gross income by the number of such calendar years in
which he had such gross income, or
(B) $750 multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which is the con-
tribution and benefit base (determined under section 230 of the Social
Security Act) in effect at the time the plan terminates and the denominator
of which is such contribution and benefit base in effect in calendar year
1974.
171. Id. § 4022(b) (8), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1322(b) (8).
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of recent basic benefit improvements. 72 This guaranteed amount will
be inadequate in an inflationary period.
The Corporation has not exercised its discretion to guarantee nonbasic
benefits; 173 accordingly, the Corporation defines a guaranteed benefit 174
as excluding health insurance, life insurance, some death benefits, and
other fringe benefits that may be necessary for retirement security. In
this and other ways the Corporation limits its potential liability to plan
participants and beneficiaries as an insurer, so that its guarantee is worth
much less than ERISA sponsors had envisioned. In addition to its pur-
poses of encouraging the continuation and maintenance of private
pension plans for participants' benefit, and providing for the timely and
uninterrupted payment of pension benefits, the Corporation is charged
with maintaining premiums that are as low as possible. 75 The statute
also instructs the Corporation to terminate a plan if its maintenance
threatens to increase the liability of the Corporation. 6 In short, the
Corporation must act like an insurance company, jealous of its own as-
sets. Not only plan participants but also employers and a frugal treasury
pressure the Corporation in making its decisions regarding plan termina-
tions, which will affect insurance premium rates.
Accordingly, it would be inequitable to relegate participants solely to
the protection of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, which has
other interests at heart, if greater protection is available to participants
under their collective bargaining agreement. The circumscribed guaran-
tees177 of the Corporation would suggest that other protection should
be sought for the participant. The balance of the benefit, not guaranteed
by the Corporation or fulfilled in assets allocation under section 4044,
still should be an enforceable debt owed to the participants or their bene-
ficiaries under the collective bargaining agreement that incorporates the
pension plan. Otherwise ERISA would negate an employer's contractual
obligation to furnish benefits through the entire term of the agreement,
while providing inadequate protection of its own in return.
172. The guaranteed amount also is subject to the limitations under id. § 4022(b) (3),
29 U.S.C.A. § 1322(b) (3). See note 170 supra.
173. See ERISA § 4022(c), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1322(c) (1975).
174. The regulations of the Corporation concerning guaranteed benefits appear in
Department of Labor Reg. §§ 2605.1-.8, 40 Fed. Reg. 43509-12 (1975). The definition of
"benefit" to which part 2605 refers appears in id. § 2605.2, 40 Fed. Reg. 43510 f1975).
175. ERISA § 4002(a) (3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1302(a) (3) (1975), specifies that the Corpora-
tion should maintain "the lowest level [of premiums] consistent with carrying out its
obligations."
176. Id. § 4042(a) (4), 29 U.S.C. § 1342 (a) (4). See note 166 supra & accompanying
text.
177. See note 168-76 supra & accompanying text.
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Fortunately, however, the benefits guaranteed by the Corporation are
not the only solace for plan participants and beneficiaries. If the Cor-
poration seeks termination, the court may appoint a trustee who has the
power to collect any payments that are due to the plan." The trustee
also can sue on behalf of the plan, provided the Corporation is not an
adverse party.179 ERISA, therefore, creates the potential for full pro-
tection for plan participants, but it does not mandate that the trustee
exercise these powers.18 0 Moreover, the statute affords no such protection
for a plan terminated by an administrator rather than by the Corporation.
If there is a liquidation, however, both are protected to a considerable
extent by the allocation-of-assets provisions of section 4044.11 Concern
for these termination protections can obscure a basic issue: the plan may
be terminated under ERISA, but not under a collective bargaining con-
tract.
3. Labor-Management Conflicts over Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation Terminations
The termination date of a pension plan is the focus of the dispute
between the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and a union seeking
to enforce a collective bargaining agreement until the expiration of its
term. The Corporation will favor a termination date that avoids a finan-
cial drain upon it while at the same time providing the minimum protec-
tion required under the Act for participants and beneficiaries. A union
with a strong collective bargaining agreement, pledging maintenance of
a pension plan throughout the term of the contract, will oppose the use
of an earlier date. An employer will prefer the Corporation alternative:
the sooner the termination, the less the employer's cost, as fewer bene-
fits will have accrued. 82 Moreover, the employer can be expected to
178. ERISA § 4042(d) (1) (B), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1342(d) (1) (B) (1975).
179. Id. § 4042(d) (1) (B) (iv), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1342(d) (1) (B) (iv).
180. Such actions may, however, fall within the scope of the trustee's duties as a
fiduciary. Id. § 4042(d) (3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1342(d) (3).
181. Id. § 4044, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1344.
182. The employer will be liable to the Corporation if plan assets are not sufficient to
pay benefits owing at the time of termination:
Any employer to which this section applies shall be liable to the corporation,
in an amount equal to the lesser of-
(1) the excess of-
(A) the current value of the plan's benefits guaranteed under this
subchapter on the date of termination over
(B) the current value of the plan's assets allocable to such benefits
on the date of termination, or
(2) 30 percent of the net worth of the employer determined as of a day,
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argue that termination by the Corporation extinguishes any remaining
rights under the contract. Some employers already have suggested, thus
far unsuccessfully, that ERISA deprives a court of jurisdiction to act
under the Labor Management Relations Act.8 3
B. Conflicts Between ERISA and Collective Bargaining Agreements on
Plan Termination: A Proposed Resolution
A method of accommodating plan terminations under ERISA with
collective bargaining agreements is needed to fulfill the Act's purposes
of protecting plan participants and beneficiaries, while maintaining the
integrity of the. collective bargaining process. A possible solution is that
contractual obligations to secure rights beyond those guaranteed by the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation should remain binding upon the
parties to the extent they do not conflict directly with statutory re-
quirements. The contract should take over when ERISA stops.' If
contractual and plan provisions do not clash with ERISA, there is no
reason why they should not remain enforceable under traditional con-
tract and labor law principles. Indeed, the Act appears to contemplate
a plan continuing or being reestablished after termination by the Cor-
poration.
chosen by the corporation but not more than 120 days prior to the date of
termination, computed without regard to any liability under this section.
Id. § 4062 (b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1362 (b).
In addition, when an employer ceases operation at a facility in any location and, as a
result of that cessation, more than 20 percent of the employee-participants are termi-
nated, the employer may be treated pursuant to id. § 4062(e), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1362(e),
as a substantial withdrawing employer subject to id. §§ 4063-65, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1363-65.
The latter sections contain reporting requirements and provide for the possibilities of
equitable fund allocation, bond posting, or payment of liability to the Corporation at
its discretion.
183. The argument that ERISA deprives the federal courts of their jurisdiction under
section 302 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 186 (Supp. 1975), was rebuffed in In re
Trustees of Joint Welfare Fund, Operating Eng'rs, Local 14, 88 L.R.R.M. 3262 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). The court commented that no language in ERISA explicitly repealed section 302,
and stated that: "Unless some specific provision of the new Act is incompatible with
[the court's] exercise of jurisdiction under the Taft-Hartley Act [LMRAI, it con-
siders its function under the latter to be unchanged." Id. at 3264. Local 14 did not
involve a plan termination under Corporation jurisdiction, however, nor were the
ERISA provisions that were cited to block the allocation of assets by the court as yet
effective as to the plan in question.
184. The creation of the Corporation could lead ultimately to contract provisions that
are drafted as deliberate supplements to the governmental guarantee, in the same way
that contractual supplemental unemployment benefits pick up where state unemployment
compensation ends.
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An employer thus may continue to be bound by contract to provide
benefits under a plan that the Corporation has terminated: after termina-
tion, the plan would operate under the collective bargaining agreement
but would lack Corporation insurance protection or tax benefits until it
requalified. 18 5 The employer's obligation would be adjusted to offset
benefits already received through allocation of assets under section
4044.8. and through Corporation coverage. This approach would pro-
tect the interests of plan participants while preserving the financial in-
tegrity of the Corporation, and thus best serve the purposes of ERISA
without subverting traditional labor law principles.
1. Legislative History and Structure of ERISA
The legislative history of ERISA indicates that Congress envisioned
Corporation insurance as a basic protection that could be supplemented
by a collective bargaining agreement. The conference committee report
noted: "[O]nce a qualified plan loses its qualification, benefits there-
after accruing are not insured." 187 The concept that benefits could
accrue after a plan loses its qualification, which could be through ter-
mination, rests on the assumption that there may be obligations that
the insurance provisions in ERISA do not affect. This view is buttressed
further by a statement that even after a plan has terminated, the employer
still is obligated to fulfill funding requirements under the plan until the
date of termination.188 The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation may
also subscribe to this view.8 9
185. Alternatively, the parties could agree to establish a new plan, less comprehensive
in coverage but more viable in view of the employer's financial condition. Benefits
would not be fully guaranteed by the Corporation until the end of the fifth year of
the plan, however. ERISA § 4022(b) (1) (B), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1322(b) (1) (B) (1975). See
note 171 supra & accompanying text.
186. ERISA § 4044, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (1975), establishes priorities for allocation of plan
assets upon termination. The Department of Labor has issued proposed regulations
further identifying the types of benefits within each priority category. 40 Fed. Reg.
51368-73 (1975).
187. CONFERENCE COMMITTEE STATEMENT, supra note 116, at 367 (emphasis supplied).
188. H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
4731.
189. George Driesen, Deputy General Counsel of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Cor-
poration, has indicated that a Corporation termination occurs when there is a cessation
of accruals and a cessation of contributions to a plan. "Driesen said that the general
counsel of PBGC has held that a claim of legal obligations to contribute does not 'keep
a plan alive if contributions are not in fact made. However, if a court decrees that
contributions should have continued, PBGC will agree with the court decree." BNA
PE, soN REP., Oct. 27, 1975, at A-15. Such a court order may be based on a ruling
that contributions were to continue through the life of a collective bargaining agreement.
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Several provisions of ERISA also contemplate the continuing vitality,
during and after termination, of a pension plan incorporated in -the
collective bargaining agreement. A trustee appointed under section
4042 (b) 190 has the power' 9' to do acts deemed necessary to continue
the operation of the plan without increasing the potential liability of the
Corporation, if those acts may be done under the provisions of the
plan.1 92 Theoretically, then, the trustee would follow collective bar-
gaining agreement language that directs that a pension plan be main-
tained, insured by the Corporation or not, for the term of the contract.
The liability of the Corporation would be limited to the period dur-
ing which the, plan was insured, but the employer would remain
obligated to comply with the contract if it extended beyond the gov-
ernmentally set termination date.
This interpretation is supported further by the remedy provisions
of ERISA. Section 502 was enacted for the purpose of enforcing em-
ployee benefit rights or the terms of the plan. 93 Nowhere does the
statute provide that pension plan termination under Title IV supplants
all beneficiaries' and participants' rights under the plan. Indeed, the
implication of section 502 is that parties' rights under ERISA and under
the plan may be distinct, and not always coextensive.9 Section 4003 (f),
moreover, authorizes a suit by any participant, beneficiary, administra-
tor, or employee adversely affected by actions of the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation or a receiver or trustee appointed by the
Corporation. 95
The fundamental motivation behind Title I of ERISA, it should be
remembered, is to "protect... the interests of participants in employee
benefit plans and their beneficiaries." 191 Title IV of the Act, creating
plan termination insurance, established the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation to achieve that underlying aim. Accordingly, two purposes
of the Corporation are to provide for timely and uninterrupted pay-
190. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1342(b) (1975).
191. This power is limited somewhat by ERISA § 4042(c), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1342(c)
(1975).
192. Id. § 4042(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1342(b). The trustee appointed under this section
can do any act authorized by the plan. Id. § 4042(d) (1) (A) (i), 29 U.S.CA.
S 1342(d) (1) (A) (i).
193. Id. § 502(a) (3) (A), (B) (ii), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1132(a) (3) (A), (B) (ii).
194. This view is in accord with that of the conference committee. See note 187
supra & accompanying text.
195. ERISA § 4003(f), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1303(f) (1975).
196. Id. § 2(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001(b).
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ments of pension benefits that the participant has earned 9 7 and "to
encourage the continuation and maintenance of voluntary private pen-
sion plans for the benefit of their participants." 119 These goals are best
accomplished by enforcing contracts that result in greater protection
for plan participants or their beneficiaries.
2. Consistency iwitb Traditional Principles
The conclusion that contractual pension termination rights that exceed
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation guarantees remain enforceable
also is consistent with fundamental concepts governing labor relations
law. To the extent that contractual provisions are not illegal, they are
enforceable. Since most collective bargaining agreements contain "sav-
ing clauses," 191 parties to a contract can enforce pension plan termina-
tion provisions that do not conflict with ERISA.
Furthermore, explicit and implicit contract rights that overlap with
rights under federal law are enforceable as long as they avoid conflict
with the statute. Equal employment opportunity laws are illustrative
of this principle. One who is the victim of discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, national origin, or religion can file a complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, later pursue the claim in federal
court,200 and still avail himself of remedies under the collective bargain-
ing agreement if that contract also bans such discrimination. The ag-
grieved party need not elect one remedy exclusively, but may pursue
both. Just as the contract remedy cannot bar the individual from exer-
cising his federal statutory rights,20' the existence of a remedy through
governmental and judicial channels cannot bar use of the contract to
redress his claim. In other areas of labor law as well, rights under a con-
tract also may be remediable under a federal statute.0 2
197. Id. § 4002(a) (2), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1302(a) (2).
198. Id. § 4002 (a) (1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1302(a) (1) (emphasis supplied).
199. For example, a contract with a saving clause that in 1963 contained pay differ-
entials based upon sex was invalidated by the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(1970), in those respects but in no others. Thus, the portions of the agreement dealing
with the grievance procedure, seniority, vacations, and other matter that did not relate
to violations of the Equal Pay Act, still were viable.
200. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (Supp. II, 1972).
201. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). But cf. Satterwhite v.
United Parcel Service, Inc., 496 F.2d 448 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974)
(dismissing a claim for overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act
that had been previously submitted to arbitration). See also Donaldson, The Use of
Arbitration To Avoid Litigation Under ERISA, 17 VM. & MARY L. REv. 215 (1975).
202. An employer's refusal to supply data on contributions made to an employee pen-
sion fund, for example, was both a violation of the contract and an unlawful refusal to
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A more direct comparison to the relationship between collective
bargaining agreements and the role of the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation in plan termination is seen in the protection provided by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which, like the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation, insures .privately contributed deposits
in the interest of protecting innocent individuals. Insurance by the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation of savings deposits up to $40,000
does not, however, bar a depositor from suing the financial institution
that fails to return the deposits in excess of the insured amount.20 3 In
the same fashion, payment of Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
insurance benefits should not bar enforcement of a collective bargaining
agreement between the employer and the union to recover the amounts
to which plan participants are entitled under the contract. Since the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation does not guarantee all benefits and
its interests lie in early plan termination, a strong contract almost always
will result in rights that exceed those protected by the statute.
C. Remedies To Enforce Collective Bargaining Agreements After Pen-
sion Benefit Guaranty Corporation Action
If the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation should seek to terminate
a plan that has not expired under the contract, a union may seek an in-
junction to stay termination.2° Other remedies available to the union are
bargain under the LMRA. Summit Tooling Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 479, 79 L.R.R.M. 1396
(1972), enforced 7ner., 474 F.2d 1352 (7th Cir. 1973).
203. 12 U.S.C. §s 1811-31 (1970). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insures
deposits in a defined set of financial institutions. The amount insured was increased to
S40,000 in 1974. Act of October 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 102, 88 Star. 1500,
amending 12 U.S.C. § 1813(m) (1970). Section 1821(g) provides, in cases of a closed
national or District of Columbia bank, that upon the payment by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation to the depositor of the deposited insured amount, the Cor-
poration "shall be subrogated to all rights of the depositor against the closed bank to
the extent of such payment." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(g) (1970) (emphasis supplied). If the
depositor does not claim the insurance benefit within the prescribed statutory time,
"all rights of the depositor against the closed bank and its shareholders, or the receiver-
ship estate to which the Corporation may have become subrogated, shall thereupon
revert to the depositor." Id. § 1822(e) (emphasis supplied). Section 1822(b) provides
that payment of the insured deposit discharges the FDIC and a successor bank to the
same extent that payment to the depositor by the closed bank would have discharged
it from liability for the insured deposit. The uninsured balance owing to the depositor
remains an enforceable debt against the defaulting bank. Id. § 1822(b).
204. The union would sue through an individual plaintiff. Section 502(a) (3) (A)
provides that a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary may sue to enjoin any act or
practice that violates any provision of the terms of the plan. ERISA § 502(a)(3)(A),
29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(3)(A) (1975). The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation also
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arbitration, or, if the employer has failed to make required contributions,
suit to enforce the contract under section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act. Alternatively, the union may seek relief before the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board for the employer's failure to live up to
promises made in collective bargaining. 2 1
With two minor exceptions, ERISA preempts no federal laws;206 its
termination provisions, however, will certainly affect the use of other
statutes. After the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation has opted to
institute termination proceedings under section 4042, the court to which
the application for appointment of a trustee is made has exclusive juris-
diction of the plan and its property.207
This provision should prevent an employer from evading pension obli-
gations by a petition to repudiate the collective bargaining agreement un-
der the Bankruptcy Act.208 Unless the suit under section 502 of ERISA is
against the plan, ection 4042 should not prevent a union from attempt-
ing to enforce compliance with the collective bargaining agreement.
Even if subjected to the constraints of section 4042, a suit under section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act would only be stayed
rather than barred. The effect on section 302(5) (B) of the Labor
Management Relations Act would be substantial, however, if a petition
were filed to break a deadlock in a Taft-Hartley plan that the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation sought to terminate.0 9
In the context of plan terminations, obligations under the collective
bargaining agreement or pension plan should remain enforceable if they
do not conflict with ERISA. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
could, therefore, institute termination proceedings for the plan, without
is amenable to suit. Id. § 4002(b) (1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1302(b) (1). Similarly, any partici-
pant, beneficiary, plan administrator, or employee adversely affected by any action of
the Corporation or a trustee appointed thereby may sue the Corporation, trustee, or
receiver if he has an interest in the plan. Id. § 4003(f), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1303(f).
205. Section 8(d) of the NLRA provides in part: "[W]here there is ... a collective
bargaining contract fin effect] . . . . the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean
that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract .... " 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) (1970).
206. See note 109 supra & accompanying text.
207. ERISA § 4042(f), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1342(f) (1975). See note 156 supra.
208. See note 156 supra.
209. 29 U.S.C.A. § 186(c) (5) (B) (Supp. 1975). Section 302 remains an open avenue for
multiemployer plans to reorganize, however, until such plans come under the termination
provisions of ERISA, as of January 1, 1978. ERISA \§ 4082(b) (1), (c), 29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1381(b) (1), (c) (1975). The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation has discretion to
cover a mukiemployer plan before that date, however. Id. § 4082(c) (1), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 1381(c) (2).
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vitiating the employer's pledge to maintain a pension plan for the dura-
tion of its collective bargaining agreement with the union. The limited
guarantee of the Corporation, which may be augmented by the exercise
of the trustee's collection powers, is available to everyone, unionized or
not, in a qualified plan. Guarantee of pension rights beyond ERISA
levels and time limits still will depend on collective bargaining achieve-
ments. Once gained at the bargaining table, those protections should not
be rendered ineffective by ERISA. This reconciliation of ERISA and
collective bargaining agreements best serves the purposes of federal
labor laws to encourage collective bargaining210 and to respect the in-
tegrity of contracts arrived at through that mechanism, without expos-
ing the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation to any liability
not intended by Congress.2 ' Moreover, it ensures plan participants the
most extensive guarantee of their benefits now possible under current
laws. By enforcing collective bargaining agreements that contain pension
obligations, the purposes of both ERISA and the labor laws will be
served.
CONCLUSION
In several major respects, ERISA will have a substantial impact on the
collective bargaining process. The Act virtually prescribes minimum
contract language, thus limiting the parties' acceptable range of agree-
ment. It requires revisions of employee benefit plans, which often must
be negotiated in midterm. Although more information is made freely
available to unions, ERISA creates a greater need for detailed informa-
tion to enable effective bargaining on employee benefits. In addition,
because the definition of a successor employer included in the Act differs
from that of the Supreme Court, another variable has been introduced
into the uncertain status of former and successor employers in relation
to incumbent unions.
The changes brought about by ERISA should not obfuscate those
areas of labor law that the Act has not altered. The parties still are obli-
gated to bargain over changes in employee benefit plans, and a refusal
210. Section 1 of the NLRA provides in pertinent part: "It is declared to be the policy
of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions of the free
flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have
occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining ... "' 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
211. The Corporation will not have to guarantee post-termination benefits until the
plan has requalified under ERISA. See ERISA §§ 4021(a), 4022(b) (1) (A), 29 U.S.C.A.
§5 1321(a), 1322(b)(1)(A) (1975).
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to bargain will result in the traditional consequences. The scope of the
duty to bargain, however, should extend only to those changes necessary
to satisfy the Act. Nor does the scheme for plan terminations incor-
porated in the Act void obligations under a collective bargaining agree-
ment that do not conflict with the Act. Participants' and beneficiaries'
rights under a terminated plan are satisfied by Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation insurance only to the extent of that guarantee; the balance
of their pension rights remains enforceable through traditional remedies.
ERISA was enacted to protect participants in collectively bargained
plans, as well as in plans formulated by other means. This statutory goal
cannot be achieved if the Act is construed to repeal rights and duties in
force prior to its enactment. If the parties to a collective bargaining con-
tract reach agreement on standards more protective of employee rights
than the provisions of the Act, ERISA should be interpreted to preserve
those rights.
